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Ilang Taong Bakwit?

A Review of Post-Marawi Crisis
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, 2017-2020

Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez

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***To Gus, Linky, Dinky, and
all the other fallen peace advocates***

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List of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank	JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines	JVA	Joint Venture Agreement
AO	Administrative Order	LASURECO	Lanao del Sur Electric Cooperative
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	LGU	Local Government Unit
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group	LRA	Land Registration Authority
ATB/ATL	Anti-Terrorism Bill/Law	LWUA	Local Water Utilities Administration
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	MAA	Most Affected Area, formerly Main Battle Area
BCDA	Bases Conversion and Development Authority	MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
BDP	Barangay Development Plan	MHT	Mindanao Humanitarian Team
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces	MTF	Mindanao Trust Fund
BIWAB	Bangsamoro Islamic Women's Auxiliary Brigade	NAP	National Action Plan
BMCRRP	Bangon Marawi Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan/Program	NCCA	National Commission for Culture and the Arts
		NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
BOL	Bangsamoro Organic Law	NDRRMF	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund
BTA	Bangsamoro Transition Authority	NEA	National Electrification Administration
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro	NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
COA	Commission on Audit	NHA	National Housing Authority
CLUP	Comprehensive Land Use Plan	OCD	Office of Civil Defense
CSO	civil society organisation	OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
DALA	Damage and Loss Assessment	OGCC	Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
DHSUD	Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development, former HUDCC	OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
DFID	Department for International Development	PCNA	Post Conflict Needs Assessment
DOH	Department of Health	PDPFP	Provincial Development and Physical Framework Plan
DENR	Department of the Environment and Natural Resources	PP	Presidential Proclamation
DepEd	Department of Education	PPP	Public-Private Partnership
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade - Australia	PSA	Philippine Statistics Authority
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government	P/CVE	preventing and countering violent extremism
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways	RISE	Marawi RISE (Resilience, Identity, Sustainability and Evolution) Plan
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry	RDANA	Rapid Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis
EU	European Union	SCM	BTA Special Committee on Marawi
GAA	General Appropriations Act	SHFC	Social Housing Finance Corporation
GPH	Government of the Philippines	SHPBNA	Social Healing and Peacebuilding Needs Assessment
HEPP	Hydroelectric Power Plant	TESDA	Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
HRNA	Human Recovery Needs Assessment	TFBM	Task Force Bangon Marawi
HUDCC	Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, now DHSUD	TWG	Technical Working Group
IDEALS	Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services	UN	United Nations
IDP	internally displaced person	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
iLEAD	Institute for Leadership, Empowerment, and Democracy	VE	Violent Extremism
INGO	international non-government organisation	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
		WB	World Bank





Overview

The unfinished reconstruction of Marawi City after the 2017 crisis, resulting in the protracted displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents, is a major humanitarian and security issue that the Philippines is in danger of forgetting. While various civil society networks have called for national government accountability over the last four years, the lack of information in the public domain hampers citizen monitoring and efforts to support community-led reconstruction and return.

To help address this data gap, this report—initially prepared in the second half of 2020—synthesizes findings from a rapid review of humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, and security programs implemented as part of post-Marawi crisis efforts from 2017 to 2020. This review finds that the Philippine government has not yet substantially completed its commitments towards the city’s reconstruction. Existing public sector efforts are predominantly focused on physical infrastructure and do not address the compounded effects of more than four years of forced displacement, let alone the drivers of conflict that enabled forms of ‘black flag’ extremism in the first place. Even with this narrow orientation towards physical infrastructure, the total estimated damages, losses, and needs in Marawi City, Butig, and Piagapo amount from PHP 50 billion to PHP 70 billion. From 2018 to 2020, only PHP 17 billion for Marawi recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction was included in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) under the NDRRM fund. Of that amount, a total of PHP 15 billion has been released. This is separate from the PHP 3.61 billion released by national government for emergency response from the 2017 NDRRM Fund even prior to the completion of the Bangon Marawi Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Plan (BMCRRP); funding from the now-defunct ARMM Regional Government or the new Bangsamoro Transition Authority; or the various donor and private sector activities that are much more difficult to track. As of this report’s publication in October 2021, the TFBM’s target is to complete most affected area (MAA) public infrastructure and allow residents to return by December 2021.

To support the completion of Marawi reconstruction, four specific technical challenges must be addressed to ensure the timely and equitable delivery of national commitments while helping local actors—specifically, the parliament of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the local governments of Marawi City and Lanao del Sur, and the Maranao civilian IDPs themselves—lead the monitoring, recovery, and reconstruction of the area. The four recommendations include: (1) expanding the framework for monitoring, evaluation, and delivery beyond physical infrastructure; (2) establishing baselines and estimating the protracted costs of conflict; (3) conducting an accurate stock-take of assistance; and (4) responding to specific community concerns related to the physical environment, land, housing, and property claims, social and economic development, cultural sensitivity, and access to information, as well as security, justice, and social cohesion.

All of these are moving targets. It is recommended that these initial findings be expanded to a broader multi-stakeholder review and through various monitoring platforms that can be managed, utilized, and led by the citizens of Marawi City to ensure truth-telling, reparations, and non-recurrence. ●





1. Background: Reviewing Marawi, Several Years After

Several years after the declared ‘liberation’ of Marawi from the five-month siege warfare between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and a coalition of ISIS-inspired local and foreign extremist fighters, the reconstruction of the Islamic city’s urban core and rehabilitation for at least three hundred thousand displaced residents **remains incomplete**.

As of 2020, Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM), the interagency body tasked by President Rodrigo Duterte to “take charge of a comprehensive and integrated rehabilitation program for Marawi and other affected localities”¹ has committed to deliver priority infrastructure by yearend 2021, the latest target in a series of delayed deadlines. However, the framework of TFBM activities primarily focuses on physical reconstruction, leaving other actors to deal with programs addressing the underlying context of conflict. This led to the parallel rise of various preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programs since 2017, funded mainly by bilateral donors and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). The series of P/CVE programs peaked with the government’s preparation of a National Action Plan (NAP) on P/CVE completed in mid-2019 with support from multiple international development partners. In the meantime, the Philippine government also passed a controversially broad Anti-Terrorism Act (Republic Act No. 11479, s. 2020)—partially justified by the Marawi siege, as highlighted in President Rodrigo Duterte’s September 2020 speech to the UN General Assembly². RA 11479, however, is not limited to the likes of the Maute or the Abu Sayyaf

Group. It has been predominantly used to pursue so-called ‘communist terrorist groups,’ triggering fears that it may be weaponized to crack down on critics or opposition groups that may fall under the law’s vague definition of ‘terrorism.’ These measures, however, have not prevented the continuing threat of ISIS-styled ‘black flag’ extremism in Lanao del Sur, even with the mobility restrictions set in place due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

TFBM itself changed composition numerous times since 2017: increasing from 23³ to 56⁴ member agencies. Notably, almost all committees and subcommittees are headed by national agencies, while the relevant affected regional, provincial, and municipal governments with the occasional exception of the City Government of Marawi are limited to a purely coordinative role despite the autonomous nature of the area.⁵ This level of fragmentation has made reconstruction efforts difficult to track, exacerbated by the lack of publicly available, comprehensive, and open reporting systems on the planning, budgeting, procurement, or implementation of Marawi reconstruction. As a result, third-party monitors from civil society or the media must rely on occasional TFBM releases, while most multilateral and bilateral donors are focused on documenting progress based on their specific mandates and deliverables, although there are notable reports from residents such as those released by the Marawi Reconstruction Conflict Watch (MRCW)⁶. In the public sector, the twists and turns of the Marawi rehabilitation process can be traced from the documentation used in national congressional hearings regarding the Compensation Bill. Thus far, the most



comprehensive public sector accounting is the 2020 report prepared by the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) and its Special Committee on Marawi.⁷ The lack of unified and updated information is exacerbated by the limited space for constructive engagement between government and civil society, as well as evidence of distrust and sometimes adversarial relationship between these sectors at various levels of governance.

The compounded effects of more than four years and counting of continued forced displacement cannot be underestimated. The extended delay of a dignified return means that internally displaced families from Marawi have been exposed to various environmental and associated physical, economic, and social vulnerabilities, including typhoons (as in the case of Tropical Storm Vinta^{8,9}), volcanic eruptions, street clearings, and demolitions (as in the case of IDP families who evacuated to areas around Taal Volcano and in other cities within Luzon¹⁰), and the effects of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, in which Lanao del Sur was one of the earliest and hardest hit provinces outside NCR.^{11,12,13,14} However, the temporal and spatial dimensions of displacement are not fully captured in reports. As such, there is a need to **take a step back** and do a **systematic, cross-disciplinary, and objective technical stocktake**.

1.1 Objectives of a Marawi review

In line with standard evaluation practice for humanitarian action and post-conflict reconstruction, there is a need to:

- **Assess** the current needs of internally-displaced individuals, families, and communities four years after the Marawi siege;
- **Review** current humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, and security programs focused on Marawi and analyze initial effects;
- **Consolidate** information on underlying causes of conflict, dissatisfaction, and radicalization pre- and post-2017, and its implications on peace and security in the region; and
- Provide an **analytical basis for future systematic evaluations** and design of effective programs, policies, and strategies—particularly in relation to ensuring delivery of commitments, supporting community-led design, monitoring, and evaluating programs; and from a justice and peacebuilding

perspective, ensuring truth-telling, reparations, and guaranteeing non-recurrence.

In post-conflict reconstruction cases in other countries, these kinds of reviews are often expanded into a multi-stakeholder review that involves the national and local leadership, international donors, INGOs, and civil society.¹⁵ In the absence of such a platform, this report attempts to distill official reports and available counternarratives to provide a **brief meta-analysis of present investments, challenges, and gaps in Marawi reconstruction**, leading to a set of **recommendations for future strategies that can be implemented in the short- and medium-term by national and regional actors and by Maranao communities themselves**. While this is not an exhaustive document, it attempts to cite existing work to **ask the right questions** as a starting point of a systematic review.

1.2 Technical Challenges in Monitoring Marawi

Existing evidence points to at least four major technical challenges relevant to monitoring and evaluating Marawi rehabilitation and reconstruction. These issues are discussed in the subsequent sections, as follows:

- *Challenges 1 and 2: Establishing a framework and baseline for evaluation and estimating the true costs of conflict.* This section reviews available data regarding Marawi's conflict-affected groups and their current situation, demographics, and needs, with notes about the technical barriers encountered in doing so. The discussion on the costs of the Marawi crisis and its aftermath builds on the Philippine Government's unreleased Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), which provides the baseline for government planning and investments. However, the PCNA does not reflect the total costs and losses due to protracted displacement. A more accurate assessment of costs must not only account for the damages incurred during the five months of urban warfare in 2017, but also the burden of accrued events over the last four years that continue to shape the lives of Marawi's displaced families, including environmental shocks (typhoons and landslides) and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Further, the geographic coverage must expand beyond Marawi City and cover spill-over communities in provinces such as Lanao del Sur that are hosting IDPs and



have suffered losses due to the destruction of a significant economic and socio-cultural hub. Given the broader dynamics of the Bangsamoro region and its peace processes, this section also explains why Marawi's recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction must include a clear cultural and peacebuilding lens.

- *Challenge 3: Conducting an accurate stocktake of post-crisis assistance.* This section attempts a stocktake of public sector investments in Marawi from 2017 to mid-2020 by asking a few basic questions: *Who are the actors? What was planned, and how? What was budgeted? What was actually implemented?* This section also includes an analysis of government budget and expenditure from the Institute for Leadership, Empowerment, and Democracy (iLEAD).
- *Challenge 4: Tracking and responding to technical issues and community concerns.* This section reviews technical challenges and community concerns covering six general and interlocking areas: (1) the built environment, which encompass land, housing, and property rights and impacts to the environment; (2) social welfare issues including but not limited to health, education, and social protection; (3) livelihoods; (4) security, justice, and social cohesion; (5) cultural sensitivity; and (6) access to information.

While much of the discussion looks at the responsibility of national and regional institutions to address the consequences of the Marawi Crisis, all sections focus on citizen perspectives and needs, sketching out processes that should be continued in a more in-depth and systematic fashion. The report concludes with a discussion of short-term and long-term recommendations, with a particular focus on the enforcement of community-led design in program monitoring and evaluation and of justice and peacebuilding principles in ensuring truth-telling, reparations, and non-recurrence. ●





2. Establishing a framework and baseline for evaluation and estimating the true cost of conflict

How do we situate the Marawi crisis within the broader dynamics of the Bangsamoro before and after the 2017 event? Who are Marawi's conflict-affected? What is their current situation? How have their demographics and needs evolved? To answer these questions, we must address some technical challenges first to prepare for a rigorous program evaluation. We must situate the evaluation within the nature of conflict and its human and physical costs in the Bangsamoro region. Next, we must expand the spatial and temporal scope of evaluation beyond Marawi and beyond the five-month warfare in 2017 and further reconcile data regarding Marawi's conflict-affected population from existing resources. Given these adjustments, we must then expand the framework for evaluation to include the endeavors of non-government actors in Marawi rehabilitation.

2.1 Situating the evaluation within the nature of conflict in the region

Various national and global technical guidelines set protocols for the evaluation of post-crisis humanitarian and development assistance. These can be inferred from reports by public sector actors (e.g., Philippine Commission on Audit, or COA) and donor-specific project audits by various international and non-government organizations (e.g., World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency). These reports often follow the standard evaluation criteria such as relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness, coherence, efficiency and value-for-money, impact, sustainability, diversity, and inclusion.¹⁶ However,

the extensive history and immense political, cultural, and social complexity at play necessitate the reconstruction of Marawi beyond physical infrastructure. Thus, methods for monitoring and evaluating traditional (physical) disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) will not apply.

The Islamic City of Marawi is the capital of Lanao del Sur, one of five provinces of the now-defunct Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines. In line with the commitments of the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) signed between the GPH and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the successful passage and ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in 2018, the ARMM was replaced with the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The BOL granted unprecedented levels of fiscal autonomy to a new regional parliament¹⁷ in exchange for the decommissioning of MILF forces, such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) and its Bangsamoro Islamic Women's Auxiliary Brigade (BIWAB), and other armed groups as part of the broadly defined 'normalization' program in the region.¹⁸

However, the Bangsamoro peace process—and its predication of Marawi's fate—is less straightforward. While the MILF are the primary peace partners under the CAB and the BOL, they are by no means the only major stakeholder or armed group operating in the region, albeit they are the largest and most legitimate as of the present day. This is further complicated by the rise of so-called 'black flag' groups such as those that gave rise to the 2017 Marawi crisis: the Maute Group (led by brothers formerly associated with the MILF), the previously island-based Abu




Sayyaf Group led by Isnilon Hapilon, and the presence of foreign jihadists from other countries in Southeast Asia.

Various studies have identified push and pull factors for recruitment into violent extremist groups, with notable variations across regions. Recruitment in the island provinces of Basilan and Sulu was typically linked to socio-economic factors. In contrast, recruitment in central Mindanao was more likely influenced by extremist teachings and messaging and recruitment methods targeting educated youth.¹⁹ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) reports (2016; 2017)²⁰ described the entry of a Cotabato ISIS/Daesh cell into the pro-Daesh community in Southern Mindanao as a result of four factors, namely: 1) effective production and dissemination of propaganda by Daesh; 2) discourses by young religious scholars supporting the caliphate; 3) the influence of social

ties; and 4) the local context of the perceived collapse of the Mindanao peace process. Jones highlighted that none of these four factors on its own would have been enough to drive individuals toward the pro-Daesh community.

The passage of the BOL and the primacy of the agreement with the MILF has been touted as the only effective counter to the threat of violent extremism (VE). Thus, situating Marawi-related actions, whether development or security-related, in the ongoing political transition with the BTA/Bangsamoro Parliament and the broader normalization process of the region is imperative. At the same time, while the MILF-led BTA has identified the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Marawi as one of its top 12 priorities for the transition, it is merely limited to coordination with TFBM. The implications of this situation are discussed further in subsequent sections.

Figure 1. Roadmap for implementing the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro



Source: OPAPP, 2019²¹



2.2 Setting the baseline: establishing human and physical costs



The Bangsamoro was already known for having inconsistent or spotty data before the Marawi siege, despite various studies and investments by government and donor organizations in the region. Thus, establishing a clear baseline of the area is necessary for understanding the human and environmental costs of the conflict and how responsive the programmed interventions are in addressing identified areas of concern.

The last Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) survey before the siege was conducted in 2015 specified the population of Marawi at 201,785.²² In contrast, initial numbers reported over 360,000 displaced individuals,²³

reflecting the city's role as the leading trade, services, and education hub of Lanao del Sur and the largest urban center in the ARMM. Lanao del Sur also had the highest poverty incidence nationwide, with 71.9% of the population living below the annual per capita poverty threshold of about \$442.8 (PHP 22,802) in 2015; compared with 53.7% for the entire region of ARMM and 21.6% nationwide.²⁴ Part of the difficulty in reconciling these numbers is the urban nature of the space: comprised of a predominantly informal economy and characterized by the high mobility of people and capital. Renowned as traders, Maranao businesspersons are largely unbanked; the only three banks²⁵ in pre-crisis Marawi were all government-owned institutions, namely Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines (AAIIBP), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).²⁶

Figure 2. Lanao del Sur Population Distribution (PSA 2015)

Lanao del Sur Population Distribution




source: Google Earth and DENR

Source: OpenMarawi.com²⁷



Figure 3. Map of most affected area (MAA) damage



Source: TFBM and OCD cited by NEDA, 2018³⁶

Government reports 168 casualties from state forces, 114 civilians, 270 unidentified individuals, 924 from combined rebel forces of Maute, ASG, and some foreign fighters, and around 88 individuals were reported missing by their relatives.²⁸ At least 1,780 hostages were also reported as rescued.²⁹ These official figures are contested because even the military admitted that it was challenging to differentiate combatants from non-combatants and hostages at the height of the siege. As such, civil society groups called for a more systematic review of the missing and the dead and Amnesty International recommended that the government should work with civil society groups and community leaders to complement their reports on casualties and missing persons.³⁰


In 2017 and 2018, the TFBM Management of the Dead and Missing Cluster was tasked to retrieve some 300-plus victims' corpses to cross-check with dental records and DNA samples.³¹ Those with positive matches were returned to their kin for burial while the rest were interred in a mass grave in a local *maqbarah*.³² The Department of Health (DOH)³³ and the Mindanao Humanitarian Team

(MHT)³⁴ sectoral reports also point to an undisclosed number of civilian deaths occurring in emergency shelters due to sepsis and other illnesses.

Notably, government reports highlight assessments on damaged infrastructure. As a result, physical damages are easier to track compared to non-infrastructure-related losses. Figure 3 shows a map of early-stage government assessments of damaged infrastructure covering approximately 250 hectares based on satellite imagery and some field assessment.³⁵ These assessments, which form components of the government's Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), were conducted from August to December 2018, well before the completion of clearance of unexploded ordnance. While the PCNA was never formally published and/or publicly distributed, images and figures cited throughout this report are drawn from the March 2018 version of the document that was circulated amongst national and local government actors and used by TFBM officials in public briefings and presentations, including those for Senate, Congress, and the Bangsamoro Transition Commission.



Figure 4. TFBM May 2019 report on unexploded ordnance clearance



Source: TFBM, 2019³⁷

Table 1 shows the official PCNA Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA) findings for Marawi City and the municipalities of Butig and Piagapo per sector, amounting to an estimated PHP 51.654 billion required for rehabilitation. These figures do not include the 'soft' process requirements for addressing the roots of conflict as spelled out in the official Social Healing and Peace Building Needs Assessment (SHPBNA) led by OPAPP.³⁸

Table 1. PCNA DALA per sector for Marawi, Butig, and Piagapo (as of March 2018)

	Damages (PHP)	Losses (PHP)	Needs (PHP)
Infrastructure	106,796,267.36	360,465,575.42	17,111,568,568.78
Transportation	22,223,053.06	147,329,342.22	16,814,700,895.55
Water	16,694,256.60	125,051,722.53	131,330,515.84
Power	54,294,494.70	87,779,110.67	157,517,294.39
Telecommunications	13,314,463.00	305,400.00	8,019,863.00
Social	7,921,126,334.93	2,181,495,503.63	10,038,088,551.33
Housing	6,147,300,563.37	2,056,477,003.63	8,192,209,678.65
Health	324,747,000.00	112,593,000.00	356,643,314.25
Education	1,449,078,771.56	12,425,500.00	1,489,235,558.43
Productive	552,200,450.00	4,117,855,110.00	18,446,873,591.16
Agriculture	87,068,450.00	300,509,833.00	772,172,110.00
Industry, Trade and Services	-	3,727,939,277.00	17,216,381,481.16
Tourism and Culture	465,132,000.00	89,406,000.00	458,320,000.00
Cross-Sectoral	2,940,639,000.00	52,280,000.00	6,057,572,883.75
Government	2,940,639,000.00	52,280,000.00	3,648,039,383.75
Environment	-	-	2,409,533,500.00
GRAND TOTAL	11,520,762,052.29	6,712,096,189.05	51,654,105,595.02

Source: TFBM PCNA, 2018⁴⁰



These figures have also been complemented by sectoral assessments and reports conducted by the Mindanao Humanitarian Team comprised of UN agencies, INGOs, and other actors across specific interest groups and sectors. A summary of the assessment of damages and needs for Marawi and surrounding areas prepared by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2018 notes that the total damages and losses of USD 348 million (PHP18.6 billion) is equivalent to about 16.7% of the then-ARMM's 2016 gross regional domestic product (GRDP) and 0.12% of the country's 2016 gross domestic product (GDP), resulting to an estimated contraction of real GRDP in 2017 by 6.3%. The private sector's share of these losses amounts to USD 124 million (PHP 6.631 billion) or 6.0% of ARMM's GRDP.³⁹ However, these figures do not include the region's social development costs or the effects of foregone investment for the last four years.

Official reports also do not include the budgetary cost of military actions by AFP and partner militaries' mobilization, equipment, and weaponry or the use of intel funds during and after the siege. While the AFP has its internal After-Battle reports, there has been no legislative inquiry into the security and military actions in Marawi. Most of the investigations focused only on the socio-economic rehabilitation of the area. Some of the detailed information on military action in the public domain are journalist reports. Two notable books included in-depth interviews with security personnel: Criselda Yabes's *The Battle of Marawi* and Carmela Fonbuena's *Marawi Siege: Stories from the Front Lines*; both released in 2020.

Various IDP groups have provided alternative documentation concerning reparations or compensation claims. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Lanao del Sur chapter has filed affidavits of over 15,000 residents claiming damages amounting to PHP 90 billion, with other pending lawsuits filed with the Regional Trial Court in Region 12.⁴¹ The government has not acknowledged any looting or human rights violation claims despite documentation by citizens, NGOs, and rights groups. However, civil society leaders state that partial monetary compensation has been provided by government to some non-Maranao citizens who were taken hostage by the Maute Group.⁴²

2.3 Expanding the spatial and temporal scope

The prolonged delay in rehabilitation and return makes the assessment and management of Marawi's impact a literal moving target, in both spatial and temporal sense.


The temporal aspect refers to additional costs and losses due to protracted displacement. The accounting of costs must include not only the damages brought by the five-month urban warfare in 2017 but also the accrued events over the last four years and counting, including environmental shocks (e.g., typhoons, landslides) and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic that continue to shape the lives of Marawi's displaced families.

The geographic scope must also expand beyond the most affected area (MAA) sectors in Marawi City and municipalities of Butig and Piagapo (see Figure 5). Several residents had to leave the city, and some even went outside the province and region to find safe homes and sources of livelihood for their families (see Figure 6). The Maranao people are known traders and have notably been more mobile than their neighbors.⁴³

However, these figures of damages and losses do not reflect the multiple layers of displacement due to natural disasters (e.g., Typhoon Vinta in 2018, recent landslides in IDP camps, IDPs who went to Luzon and other areas but were displaced by the Taal eruption and other calamities) and the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, the geographic coverage must expand beyond Marawi City and cover spill-over communities in provinces such as Lanao del Sur that are hosting IDPs and have suffered losses due to the destruction of a significant economic and socio-cultural hub.




Figure 5. Sectorized mapping of most affected area (MAA)



Source: TFBM, 2018⁴⁴

Figure 6. Scope of initial displacement (as of June 2017)



Source: UN OCHA, 2017⁴⁵



2.4 Reconciling available data

Accurately defining and tracking Marawi's conflict-affected to answer basic questions about how many were impacted and where they are located is hampered by the lack of publicly available, disaggregated, and open format data. Table 2 summarizes the major data collection processes undertaken by the TFBM in the first three years, which deployed various surveys to gather quantitative and qualitative data related to eligibility for relief goods, assistance in cash or kind, and claims related to land, housing, and property.

The BTA Special Committee on Marawi (SCM) report and the accompanying technical paper prepared by Assad Baunto in 2020⁴⁶ highlight critical issues in reconciling Marawi-related data (see Table 3). These issues arise from multiple but uncoordinated data sources, such as the TFBM surveys against existing survey and administrative data held by PSA and other national and regional actors.

A significant aspect of these data gaps is that up to 95% of IDPs are home-based, not in evacuation centers (ECs) or temporary housing.⁴⁷

Table 2. Major Data Collection processes undertaken by TFBM

Activity	Timeframe	Description
Kambalingan (return)	October 2017 onwards	Return of displaced residents with homes outside the MAA. The barangays were clustered into zones based on the schedule of return.
PCNA	August to December 2017	Government multi-sectoral assessment to estimate the short-term interventions needed to initiate financial recovery requirements. Human Recovery Needs Assessment (HRNA) : August 2017 Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) : September to December 2017. Social Healing and Peacebuilding Assessments (SHPBNA) conducted by OPAPP in partnership with the Mindanao State University – Iligan Institute of Technology Institute of Peace and Development in Mindanao (MSU IIT IPDM) in early 2018.
Kambisita 1	1 April 2018 to 10 May 2018	Visitation program that allowed displaced families to briefly visit their homes in MAAs. A total of 10,835 families or 77,700 individuals were able to enter MAAs to retrieve their personal belongings.
Kambisita 2	August 2018	Visitation program allowing residents to return and to identify their properties. For both rounds of Kambisita, the MAA visit was divided into nine sectors, with a three-day window allowed for each sector.
Kathanor	Launched October 2018	Biometrics profiling undertaken by TFBM/DSWD with technical support from World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Bank to build the Residency Master List.
Social Cartography	Parallel to Kambisita	Triangulation of land and property claims by DENR/LRA
Kathangombalay	July 2019 onwards	Profiling of returning homeowners regarding real property ownership in the MAA, including metes and bounds of claimed parcels. Once ownership claims are validated by TFBM using formal documents such as registered land titles, IDPs residents in cleared areas are issued a permit to repair or reconstruct their homes.



However, TFBM's systems are presently geared towards those in ECs and the house-based IDPs who are consolidated in Marawi and its surrounding areas and those who were willing and able to travel back to participate in TFBM data collection activities. Thus, the Kathanon activity did not include those who have left for other cities such as Zamboanga or Manila and have been

unable to return. There is also the perception amongst IDP residents that the TFBM master list excludes households or individuals who were able to rent or "share" a home or business space free of charge in the MAA, despite having a specific period allotted for such individuals during the Kathanon in August 2019.⁴⁸

Table 3. Basic information on IDPs, dwelling, and registered titles

	Indicators	Marawi City	24 Most-Affected Barangays
1	No. of households (pre-Siege) <i>Source: 2015 Census of Population and Housing, PSA</i>	29,732 households	9,676 households
2	No. of occupied housing units (pre-Siege) <i>Source: 2015 Census of Population and Housing, PSA</i>	20,121 houses	7,037 houses
3	No. of households who OWN or who have owner-like possession of both house and lot <i>Source: 2015 Census of Population and Housing, PSA</i>	19,773 households	5,487 households
4	No. of households who OWN house but RENT lot <i>Source: 2015 Census of Population and Housing, PSA</i>	1,824 households	1,343 households
5	Total cumulative no. of IDPs (as of March 2019 from start of Siege) <i>Source: DSWD (February 11, 2020 ppt presentation)</i>	Total: 77,170 families Of which, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12,142 families are still displaced (as of March 2019) 65,028 families already returned home 	
6	Total current no. of IDPs (as of March 2019) <i>Source: DSWD (February 11, 2020 ppt presentation)</i>	Total: 12,142 families Of which, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 388 families still in evacuation centers 11,754 families are home-based IDPs 	
7	Total no. of IDP households profiled during the TFBM's Kathanon <i>Source: TFBM (February 11, 2020 ppt presentation)</i>	46,073 families (equivalent to 217,453 individuals profiled) Plus, 3,787 households that rented their dwellings in Marawi City	



	Indicators	Marawi City	24 Most-Affected Barangays
8	Total no. of IDP families with property claims, based on TFBM's Social Cartography <i>Source: TFBM (February 11, 2020 ppt presentation)</i>		12,961 families Of which, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6,314 families are claimants of structures only • 687 families are claimants of lots only • 5,960 families are claimants of both land and structures
9	Total no. approved building permit issued by the Office of the Marawi City Engineer's Office <i>Source: City of Engineer's Office (February 11, 2020 ppt presentation)</i>		1,475 building permits
10	Total no. of currently displaced families that are either home-based or still in transitory shelters <i>Source: TFBM (February 11, 2020 ppt presentation)</i>	17,841 families	
11	Total no. of actual structures <i>Source: TFBM (February 11, 2020 ppt presentation)</i>		Total: 6,062 Of which, 2,847 secured consent for demolition
12	Total no. of homeowners in the 24 most affected barangays that registered in the TFBM's Kathagombalay <i>Source: TFBM (February 11, 2020 ppt presentation)</i>		Total: 4,950 homeowners Of which: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3,072 homeowners – are still processing their application • 1,536 homeowners – have completed their papers for validation • 342 homeowners – with approved application and are currently conducting repair and reconstruction of their respective properties
13	Total no. of registered titles (as of February 11, 2020) <i>Source: LRA</i>	6,458 registered titles Of which: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4,901 are active • 1,550 are cancelled • 7 are partially cancelled 	

Source: SCM, 2020⁴⁹; Baunto, 2020⁵⁰



According to the 2020 Special Committee on Marawi report:

The Kathanon profiled a total of 46,073 displaced households (equivalent to 217,453 displaced individuals) and 3,797 individual renters in Marawi City. No information on sharers was provided.

The TFBM used the profile and biometric data of renters and sharers to validate the Kathanon master list. As of November 25, 2019, the TFBM removed the duplicate entries from the master list of IDPs (2,728 individuals) and “deactivated” the entries that the TFBM found to be spurious IDPs (679 households). It also noted that about 567 individuals have “on-going adjudication.” Hence, the 46,073 displaced households represent the validated total figure in the TFBM profile.

*IDPs who were left out in the master list or who were initially included in the master list but failed to have their biometric information taken have not, and cannot, receive assistance from the TFBM.*⁵¹

requiring such a plan have never had the same degree of fragmentation. As will be discussed in later sections, this divide can be partially traced to the initial TFBM plan of having separate financing regimes for the MAA and non-MAA areas. The MAA rehabilitation effort was initially envisioned as a single package to be procured through a joint-venture agreement with a private firm.⁵² This plan eventually failed and had to be reworked.

The fragmentation of Marawi relief and rehab design affects not only public sector investments but also how international donors, INGOs, and the private sector can work and complement public thrusts. Although notably, some infrastructure-heavy donors (such as JICA-ADB through their partnership with DPWH) were able to integrate better with the BMCRRP. The geographic scope’s limitation to Marawi, Butig, and Piagapo also impacts rehabilitation, which other INGOs and CSOs have now complemented by working in spill-over municipalities such as Saguwaran and Marantao. ●

2.5 Expanding the Framework for Evaluation

A major challenge in implementation and evaluation is the lack of a unified, consolidated plan. Official Marawi reconstruction efforts are divided into two plans: the Bangon Marawi Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan/Program (BMCRRP) and the Marawi RISE (Resilience, Identity, Sustainability and Evolution) Plan. The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) oversees the BMCRRP’s drafting and monitoring, which only covers Marawi City outside the 24 most-affected barangays and select areas in the municipalities of Butig and Piagapo who were attacked by the Maute group in the months leading up to the siege. The Marawi RISE Plan, on the other hand, focuses specifically on the 24 barangays of the MAA and is directly supervised by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC, now the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development or DHSUD) and its sub-agencies, including the National Housing Authority (NHA). The lack of a single consolidated plan is highly irregular in post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction. All other major disasters





3. Conducting an accurate stocktake of post-crisis assistance

This section begins a stock-taking of public sector investments in Marawi from 2017 to mid-2020 by asking a few basic questions: *Who are the actors involved and how do they relate to each other? How are decisions made? What was planned, budgeted, and has been actually implemented by the National Government, donors, and the private sector? How do these elements feed into a viable vision for post-crisis Marawi?*

While these are basic questions, the lack of transparency in national government funding for Marawi Rehabilitation and the various technical issues described in the previous section makes it challenging to track. This is further complicated by the complex governance and coordination arrangements among national, regional, and local actors and relevant development partners.

To help establish the timeline of events, a series of infographics prepared by the legal NGO Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services (IDEALS) is attached as Annex 1.⁵³ The infographic provides a general picture of events, and government, donor, and civil society responses from 2017 to 2018. While this only covers the first year of post-Marawi activities, it provides the general scope of the early phase, which tapered off by 2019 and 2020 given competing priorities, external events (e.g., 2019 midterm elections and the onset of the pandemic in 2020, and problems such as donor fatigue).

As will be discussed further in this section, while the plans and frameworks of the BMCRRP and the Marawi RISE plan read well, there is a clear prioritization of physical infrastructure over all other aspects of recovery. Even with this narrow orientation towards physical infrastructure, there is a massive gap between the estimated needs for reconstructing Marawi City, Butig, and Piagapo (ranging

from PHP 51.6 billion based on the original March 2018 TFBM PCNA⁵⁴ and BMCRRP⁵⁵ estimate to later figures of PHP 70⁵⁶ to 86.5 billion⁵⁷) and what has actually been budgeted and delivered. This will be discussed further through an analysis of government budgeting and expenditure prepared by the Institute for Leadership, Empowerment, and Democracy (iLEAD), which found that GAA allocations under the NDRRM Fund since 2018 have only amounted to a total of PHP 17 billion. Of that amount, a total of PHP15 billion has been released as of late 2020, although it is expected that spending will accelerate closer to the December 2021 deadline and prior to the May 2022 elections. This is separate from the PHP 3.6 billion released from the 2017 NDRRM fund for emergency response, the just over PHP1 billion from the defunct ARMM and the current BTA, or private sector and donor projects. More importantly, this analysis does not include issues related to procurement, subcontracting, or the quality of implementation. Even with donor-funded projects possibly exceeding government spending, what does this entail for the goal of assisting residents to return?

3.1 Who are involved?

Marawi rehabilitation and response is overseen by Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM), a top-down and ad-hoc national government-led coordination mechanism created under Administrative Order (AO) No. 3 in June 2017 (“Creating an Inter-agency Task Force for the Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of the City of Marawi and other affected Localities”). This was later amended by AO No. 9 in October 2017, which reorganized TFBM and transferred the leadership from the DND-AFP to HUDCC, which is now DHSUD.

The creation of TFBM reflects the tendency of the government to create special task forces. This adds



another layer of complexity on top of what is provided for under Republic Act No. 10121 (“Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act”) and the mandates of the civilian interagency of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Mitigation Council.

As of present writing, the TFBM is comprised of 56 national member agencies, while the relevant regional, provincial, and city/municipal governments are limited to a largely coordinative role despite the autonomous nature of the area.^{58,59} Jurisdiction over the region also changed from ARMM to BARMM after the passing of the Bangsamoro


Organic Law and is subject to special governance arrangements based on multiple signed peace agreements.

3.1.1 Government Actors: Task Force Bangon Marawi

Figure 7 below illustrates the staffing and command structure of TFBM in 2017 based on AO No. 9. At the field level, work is managed by HUDCC with secretariat support from the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), which was not devolved to the ARMM Regional Government. The Mayor of Marawi City is designated co-manager alongside HUDCC.

Figure 7. TFBM Organizational Structure

Source: NEDA, 2018⁶⁰



3.1.2 Government Actors: Bangon Marawi Selection Committee and the Swiss Challenge

While AO No. 3 and AO No. 9 describe the broader governance arrangements for Marawi, the early decision to separate the planning and rehab process for the MAA and non-MAA areas led President Duterte to sign Executive Order No. 49, s. 2018, exempting the National Housing Authority from the NEDA guidelines on pursuing joint venture agreements (JVAs) for projects in the MAA.⁶¹ This came several days after President Duterte expressed a preference for a joint venture agreement to skirt public bidding requirements and accordant delays.⁶²

The decision implied that to ‘fast-track’ implementation, all major infrastructure rehabilitation for the city’s MAA would be packaged into a single contract and procured through a private-public partnership or joint venture agreement (JVA) with a private firm.⁶³ The Bangon Marawi Selection Committee (BMSC) was created to finalize the requirements and serve as the bids and awards committee for selecting a developer for a project worth PHP 17.2 billion to PHP 20 billion.⁶⁴ The signatory to this JVA would be the National Housing Authority, a member agency under the HUDCC/DHSUD led by TFBM Chair del Rosario.⁶⁵

A ‘Swiss Challenge’ was announced in late 2017.⁶⁶ Under this procurement method, unsolicited proposals would be accepted. Other groups could challenge each bid and the awarding of contract would be based on the best-submitted proposal as per the stated minimum requirements for the rehabilitation.⁶⁷

Two layers were created: a 14-person Technical Working Group (TWG), seven of whom are voting members, namely the general manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA); the secretary general of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC); the assistant secretaries of the Finance, Public Works, and Environment and Natural Resources departments; the NHA operations head; and the HUDCC deputy secretary general.⁶⁸

The TFBM’s selection committee TWG membership is listed below, while the list of voting members is shown in an infographic by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) in Figure 8.

1. Chairperson, Deputy Secretary General from HUDCC
2. Vice Chairperson, Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA);
3. Member, two from the NHA Legal and Finance;
4. Member, one from the HUDCC;
5. Member, one from the DOF;
6. Member, one from the DENR;
7. Member, one from the Office of Civil Defense (OCD);
8. Member, one from the DPWH;
9. Member, one from the DILG;
10. Member, one from the PPP Center;
11. Member, one from the Mindanao Development Authority;
12. Member, one from the LGU of Marawi City;
13. Member, one from the Provincial Government of Lanao del Sur; and
14. Observer, one from COA.


It is notable that NEDA was not included in the TWG. This exclusion is against standard Philippine procurement practice on public bidding and the National Economic and Development Authority-Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA-ICC) guidelines,⁶⁹ which governs public contracts worth one billion or more. To quote a report from PCIJ dated May 2018:⁷⁰

PCIJ confirmed this with NEDA Deputy Director-General Adoracion M. Navarro. She said that NEDA Director-General Ernesto Pernia had sent a letter to TFBM chairperson and Housing Secretary Eduardo D. del Rosario “asking that NEDA be excluded from the joint venture Selection Committee (the body that acts as the bids and awards committee) as well as from the Technical Working Group (the body that is responsible for the processing of eligibility documents and preliminary evaluation of proposals).”

“On the negotiations for the MAA rehabilitation, NEDA is not involved,” Navarro said, but “NEDA provided guidance as a resource institution during some of the meetings.”



Figure 8. TFBM MAA Selection Committee



Source: PCIJ, 2018⁷¹

The whole Swiss Challenge attempt ultimately failed, wasting almost a year in the process. Reports point to concerns raised by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), PPP Center, and DOF about the legality of JVA as a procurement modality. Negotiations with two China-led groups, namely Bangon Marawi Consortium and PowerChina, fell through.

In June 2018, the Bangon Marawi Consortium (composed of five Chinese and three local firms led by China State Construction Engineering Corp. Ltd., and included two firms previously blacklisted by the World Bank) was deemed ineligible.⁷² These two blacklisted companies—China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) and China Geo-Engineering

Corporation (CGC)—were put on the World Bank ineligibility list for corruption in 2009, but were defended by Malacañang, saying that they deserve another chance.⁷³

The TFBM was also in the final stage of talks with the second potential developer, Beijing-based Power Construction Corporation of China or PowerChina, when the PPP Center issued its recommendation that negotiated procurement would be the method of procurement for the non-income-generating Marawi rehabilitation components.⁷⁴ It took TFBM at least five months to concede that the BCDA's suggested JVA mode for the entirety of Marawi rehabilitation is illegal.⁷⁵

The former donor coordination mechanism, the Mindanao Working Group, has not been active since the PAPP under Dureza attempted to formulate a “Mindanao Peace and Development Framework.” However, the framework was not approved at the cabinet level and was abandoned after the OPAPP changed leadership in 2018. No government tracker for Marawi international donor investments exists. This can be regarded as a failure compared to previous disaster response monitoring endeavors, such as the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAITH), later replaced by the e-Management Platform for Accountability and Transparency Hub for Yolanda (eMPATHY) for monitoring rehabilitation efforts after super typhoon Yolanda.

3.2 What was planned and budgeted for by the government, and how?

3.2.1 How was the planning done?

The fragmentation of the planning and governance frameworks around the Marawi reconstruction was a significant source of initial confusion. It caused substantial delays and inefficiencies in implementation—all of which remain highly opaque to affected Marawi residents themselves.

By late 2017, there were multiple pre-MAA plans being developed covering various aspects of rehabilitation and reconstruction at multiple scales. However, there was limited coordination and interaction, whether at strategic or operational levels. Apart from the BMCRRP led by NEDA and the eventual MAA Marawi RISE plan, which was built on top of updating the Marawi City Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), other actors also had separate planning processes. This included the Barangay Development Plans,⁷⁹ the activities supported by the ARMM Regional Government, and at least two other planning documents—one prepared by the Provincial Government of Lanao del Sur with support from UNDP, and a proposed draft plan from the Mindanao State University Marawi.

This does not include separate sectoral and cluster plans, many of whom were led or financed by donor agencies (e.g., the World Health Organization supported the Department for Health for a health plan), while the relevant INGOs and NGOs supported the appropriate TFBM cluster to prepare a Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WaSH)

Plan. Most of the efforts and attempts to consolidate and reconcile these efforts and manage institutional dynamics occurred in late 2017 and the first half of 2018.


Figure 10 and Figure 11 show slides from a presentation delivered by TFBM Chairperson Eduardo del Rosario to local actors on January 08, 2018, which provide a sense of how the national leadership initially intended the planning processes for the BMCRRP and the MAA Swiss Challenge to unfold. As will be discussed in later sections, both the MAA and non-MAA timelines were delayed by at least a year. Project lists under the BMCRRP were still being revised almost a year after the intended completion. The timelines also show that the government processes for planning and decision-making substantially deviated after 2017.

In line with standard post-disaster recovery preparation processes,⁸⁰ the first step is to conduct damage/loss and needs assessment activities that must be initiated by the Office of Civil Defense through the preparation of an initial Rapid Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis (RDANA) Report. This is followed by a TFBM and OCD-led Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) integrated with the Social Healing and Peacebuilding Assessments (SHPBNA). In addition to that is the inclusion of standard Human Recovery Needs Assessment (HRNA) and Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA) components present in non-armed conflict-related tools. Although partial drafts of the PCNA were circulating amongst government agencies by March 2018, the report was never released publicly for reasons unknown. Thus, government agencies at the national and regional levels were forced to implement separate sectoral programs without the benefit of a consolidated PCNA.

As the vice-chair for the Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery of the NDRRMC, NEDA is also mandated to prepare a rehabilitation and recovery program, especially in cases of national calamity like the Marawi crisis. Available documents show that though NEDA followed the standard lengthy multi-sectoral planning procedures as provided for in existing DRRM legislation and practice, the planning process for the Marawi RISE Plan for the MAA focused only on the built environment—driven by the need to generate a list of minimum development requirements for the purported Swiss Challenge package.




Figure 10. Projected BM-CRRP Formulation Timetable as of January 2018



Source: TFBM, 2018⁸¹

Figure 11. Projected MAA Swiss Challenge Timeline as of January 2018



Source: TFBM, 2018⁸²



3.2.2 What was planned?

Figure 12, 13 and 14 show the strategic frameworks and components of both the BMCRRP and the Marawi RISE plan for the MAA. While the BMCRRP's logical framework ties into sectoral clusters and each line agency programs accordingly, the Marawi RISE Framework is tailored to address architectural and spatial designs for land use and identify priority horizontal and vertical infrastructure. As of present writing, it is unclear how the Bangsamoro Transition Authority's new Marawi program launched in late 2020⁸³ will integrate efforts into what has already been laid out in the two separate national plans. While some assume that the TFBM's duties were already turned over to the BARMM Parliament as part of the transition mandated by 2014 CAB and its enabling law, this is not the case. TFBM retains responsibility for the execution of Marawi rehabilitation as directed by AO No.9,⁸⁴ while the MILF-led

BTA merely plays a coordinative role⁸⁵ and has its separate PHP 500 million budget (see Table 4) for implementing relevant programs for the area.

However, these plans must be compared to what has actually been financed from national, regional, local, and private donor sources and what was actually implemented on the ground.

Table 4 shows that of the projected PHP 50 to 70 billion requirement for reconstructing Marawi, only PHP17 billion was explicitly budgeted in the 2018-2020 General Appropriations Acts, specifically under the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRM) Fund. Apart from these appropriations in the previous GAAs, there was also a one billion funding support for Marawi recovery in the budgets of the now-defunct ARMM government and the present BARMM government.

Table 4. National and regional appropriations for Marawi response, 2017-2020

	2017	2018	2019	2020	OVERALL
Budget for Marawi Recovery <i>under the NDRRMF [1]</i>	-	10,000,000,000	3,500,000,000	3,500,000,000	17,000,000,000
Releases for Marawi Recovery <i>under the NDRRMF [1]</i>	3,612,839,102	3,821,819,991	4,466,765,209	6,786,188,401	18,687,612,703
Releases for Marawi Recovery <i>under the ARMM/ BARMM</i>	566, 229, 000 <i>(from May 24, 2017 to September 30, 2018)</i> [2]		500,000, 000 <i>(original allocations prior to transition)</i> [3]		1,066,229,000

Sources:

[1] iLEAD Supplementary Research

[2] ARMM Regional Planning and Development Office, 2019⁸⁶

[3] Special Committee on Marawi, 2020⁸⁷




3.2.3 Plans and Budgeting for Humanitarian Aid and Non-MAA projects (BMCRRP)

It was only in 2018 that serious, comprehensive planning for Marawi reconstruction began. Before that, funding support from the national government was mainly intended for humanitarian relief. As previously shown in Table 4, the national government released a total of PHP 3.6 billion from the NDRRM Fund to several national government agencies, GOCCs, and other executive offices

in 2017. The bulk of fund releases went to DSWD, which received PHP3 billion for emergency assistance and cash for work programs for the IDPs of Marawi City. Funds were also released for emergency assistance activities of the DOH and DILG, transitional shelters and utilities to NHA, the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and the National Electrification Administration (NEA), and early livelihood assistance programs to DTI. (See Annex 2 for detailed breakdown)

Figure 12. BMCRRP Framework



Source: NEDA, 2018⁸⁸



From 2018 to 2020, a total of PHP17 billion was appropriated under the NDRRM Fund for the Marawi recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Even before completing the Marawi BMCRRP, the national government allocated PH10 billion for recovery and rehabilitation under the 2018 GAA. This was likely done to ensure that funds would be available in the event that a comprehensive plan was finalized. As such, no breakdown by implementing unit or purpose was included in the 2018 GAA except for a special provision in the NDRRM Fund, which stated that the amount appropriated will be used for recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction, aid, and relief projects in Marawi City and other areas affected by the siege.

Based on the ARMM Transition Report prepared by the now-defunct ARMM Regional Government, around PHP566.229 million in Marawi response funds were released and spent from the beginning of the siege until September 2018, covering a mix of relief operations and infrastructure projects such as housing and relief through ARMM-HEART.^{89,90} Upon the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, the ARMM was abolished and replaced by the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, which took on the assets and liabilities of the region. In 2020, PHP 500 million from unspent funds from the 2019 ARMM Budget was reprogrammed by the BTA into a Marawi response program following the recommendations of the BTA Special Committee on Marawi.⁹¹

Section 3.3 will discuss actual releases under the NDRRM fund and those implemented by the now-defunct ARMM Regional Government and the current Bangsamoro Transition Authority. Detailed information based on available budget releases by agency and sector analyzed by iLEAD is also attached as Annex 2.

3.2.4 Plans for MAA Development

Planning for the MAA began with the preparation of a new Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) for Marawi from December 2017 onwards because the CLUP for the city (and its equivalent spatial plan for the province as a whole, the PDPFP) had not been updated since the 1960s. The CLUP updating effort was led by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), facilitated by its northern Mindanao and Davao regional offices and a team from the Philippine Institute of Environmental Planners (PIEP). Simultaneously, the Provincial Government of Lanao del Sur initiated updating their Provincial Development and Physical Framework Plan (PDPFP) with technical assistance from the now-defunct ARMM Regional Planning and Development Office (RPDO), which headed the TFBM counterpart at the regional level. As of early 2021, both plans are complete but are not in the public domain. The Lanao del Sur PDPFP, in particular, awaits final approval by the newly-constituted BARMM Regional Land Use Committee.


The Marawi RISE Plan for the MAA was prepared in parallel to the CLUP updating process, driven by the need to put together and finalize a list of minimum development requirements for the Joint Venture Agreement envisioned by the TFBM and the Bangon Marawi Selection Committee.

Figure 13 shows the general land use plan for the MAA and the division of the 24 barangays into four clusters/quadrants, with each block corresponding to specific land uses. The plan further envisioned the widening of road networks based on primary, secondary, and tertiary classifications. Reclamation of additional land adjacent to Lake Lanao and the clearing of easements beside the Agus River were also envisioned.

Later, the land use plan was presented alongside architectural renderings of the identified list of 22 priority infrastructure projects as part of the bids of the private firms engaged by TFBM. (See Figures 15-17).



Figure 13. Marawi land use plan and concept



Source: TFBM, 2019⁹²

Figure 14. Marawi RISE Plan framework



Source: TFBM, 2019⁹³



Figure 15. MAA Master Development Plan and Priority Infrastructure



Source: Special Committee on Marawi, 2020⁹⁴

Figure 16. Images of proposed vertical infrastructure



Source: TFBM, 2019⁹⁵

As previously discussed, the TFBM Selection Committee was in charge of finalizing the list of priority infrastructure for inclusion in the MAA contract, both horizontal (roads and bridges) and vertical (public buildings and facilities). This package of projects was collectively costed between PHP17.2 billion to PHP 20 billion.⁹⁶ The priority list of projects did not include the cost of rebuilding private homes, as various government lawyers were of the opinion that taxpayer money could not be used for private homes, or that no public funds could be used for private goods.⁹⁷ Instead, the BMCRRP included items for temporary housing outside the MAA, particularly in Barangay Sagonsongan, and housing for residents who will be displaced by these road widening and other infrastructure projects, which would completely restructure the spatial form of the area.⁹⁸

The MAA plans, however, triggered various concerns amongst residents, many of which remain unaddressed. Based on TFBM public consultations in Marawi City in 2018, some contested the government's decision to change the city core's spatial layout (with the principle of 'building back better') and put horizontal and vertical infrastructure first. The people contended that it could cause additional delays in return at best while causing dispossession at worst. This led to cries from civil society members for government to clear the rubble as fast as possible, get out of the way, and allow residents to rebuild their own homes on their own terms.

Other concerns included valid fears that the road widening and other projects would lead to affected families on either side of the road losing their homes



through expropriation, particularly residents who did not own formal titles due to the complex tenorial setup in the city. Figures 18 and 19 illustrate some findings from the *Atoran ko Dansalan*—a series of multi-stakeholder workshops where residents (including TFBM, ARMM, and provincial and city government representatives) expressed their best and worst-case scenarios, including the undesired vision of ‘Marawi becoming Makati’—that is, redesigned by non-Maranao residents into an overplanned space of glass and concrete that is incompatible with local values and customs and is no longer under the residents’ control.

Further discussion of concerns related to the MAA is covered in Section 4.1.1 on issues related to land,

housing, and property. The depth of these technical issues exposes how the MAA plan, despite supposedly being grounded in the CLUP and the prerequisite analysis, was essentially a wishlist of desired structures that are difficult to implement without the corresponding details of land ownership and property management and economic and financial return calculations.






Ultimately the various technical and legal infirmities in the TFBM’s joint venture scheme led to a failure of bidding—one which partially stems from the government decision to outsource basic planning functions to the private sector, which has less information on what is needed and desired by the affected residents.

Figure 17. Architectural rendering of proposed infrastructure project



Source: TFBM, 2018⁹⁹

Figure 18. An excerpt of the findings from Atoran ko Dansalan community consultations

Sample result of scenario building for downtown area		IDEAL	STATUS QUO	WORST CASE
Definition of MAA Scenarios		Certain spaces are immediately rehabilitated. People are allowed to rebuild houses once utilities and roads are in place	The new military camp is built first before rehabilitation efforts proceed	Private developers dominate the rehabilitation effort. Citizens are left out. Marawi becomes Makati
Drawing				
Description and Situation (planning/design, governance/legislation, and economy/finance)		Rehabilitation begins ASAP. Electricity and water are restored. Discussions about road widening. People avail of financing for construction. Financing from government and other sources are clearly identified and properly programmed.	Residents of MAA continue to stay in evacuation centers or their relatives. Resentment among people. Government prioritizes military spaces and agenda.	There is a modern city business district. People are not allowed to rebuild in some areas that are declared commercial. Widespread displacement and anger. Benefits of commercial district is extremely privatized. People are excluded and bear losses

Source: OpenMarawi.com¹⁰⁰

3.3 What has been actually funded and implemented?

As shown in the iLEAD report, PHP17 billion has been allotted from 2018 to 2020 for Marawi rehabilitation, but only PHP15 billion has been released. Tracking the unaccounted portion of these budgets has been difficult due to limitations in granular budget line items in the GAAs. Nevertheless, most of this financing was intended for physical infrastructure and emergency humanitarian response costs identified in the PCNA implemented by DSWD and the economic cluster for livelihood. The SHPBNA also identified limited support for the 'soft' relational investments. However, as noted previously, most of these gaps were addressed by donors, INGOs, and CSOs, albeit these projects are also difficult to track.


As will be discussed in the subsequent sections, the TFBM Joint Venture debacle contributed to at least one year of delays, alongside the challenges encountered in clearing debris and unexploded ordnance, which was reportedly 99% completed as of yearend 2019.¹⁰¹ The MAA list of priority infrastructure (horizontal and vertical) has been changing as well, although TFBM commits to complete priority infrastructure by December 2021. Implementation activities are expected to accelerate

closer to this date, and prior to the elections-related public works ban which will run from 25 March to 8 May 2022. It is unclear if the TFBM will be applying for an exemption to the Commission on Elections.

In the absence of a holistic review of the Marawi response, parts of the picture can be seen in individual COA audits conducted per agency or in donor-specific audits by organizations such as the WB, DFAT-Australia, EU, JICA, etc.). Reports on releases from the NDRRM Fund published online by the Department of Budget and Management also give an idea on which reconstruction projects have actually been funded. Figure 19 shows a summary of the funding levels for Marawi reconstruction from the NDRRM Fund. Despite sizeable annual GAA appropriations, the allocated funding is only better utilized as part of Continuing Appropriations in the following year, demonstrating a lagging government expenditure for Marawi rehabilitation. For example, PHP10 billion has been allocated under the 2018 GAA, but only PHP4.88 has been released. The remaining funds were carried over as Continuing Appropriations, of which PHP4.4 billion was released. Similarly, PHP 3.5 billion has been allocated under the 2019 GAA, but only PHP62.97 million was released. The remaining funds were again carried over as Continuing Appropriations, of which PHP3.44 billion was released.



Figure 19. NDRRMF Releases



3.3.1 Humanitarian Aid and Non-MAA projects

Based on early 2020 estimates from TFBM, NEDA, and the World Bank, roughly 210 out of the 744 plans, programs, and activities listed in the BMCRRP have been implemented thus far. However, there is no clear information on what that means in terms of the overall picture, let alone the quality, value-for-money, appropriateness of implementation, or

how responsive it was with the needs identified in the PCNA, SHPBNA, and BMCRRP.

Figure 20 shows the total releases from the NDRMM Fund by sector, in which infrastructure and housing took a huge portion of the fiscal allocations for Marawi. Table 5, on the other hand, shows the disaggregated shares for each sector and the pertinent projects pursued under each one.

Figure 20. Releases per Sector




Table 5. Total Releases for Marawi Recovery per Sector, 2017-2020

Sector	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Housing and Settlement	274,397,555	174,502,407	2,408,206,142	5,182,234,949	8,039,341,053
Housing	218,537,125		1,953,936,125	2,066,650,628	4,239,123,878
Water	39,995,122	174,502,407	134,463,618	766,536,382	1,115,497,529
Power	15,865,308		319,806,399	45,932,228	381,603,935
Utilities				2,303,115,711	2,303,115,711
Livelihood and Business	75,337,800	272,421,896	152,200,000	111,544,944	611,504,640
Industry, Trade & Services	53,000,000	114,953,490			167,953,490
Agriculture	22,337,800				22,337,800
Skills Development		6,328,241			6,328,241
Livelihood		62,535,755		111,544,944	174,080,699
Business Development		88,604,410	152,200,000		240,804,410
Infrastructure		183,900,000	975,426,350	1,022,362,171	2,181,688,521
Public Works		183,900,000	131,322,775	391,722,957	706,945,732
LGU Infrastructure			458,191,000	558,191,000	1,016,382,000
Buildings			385,912,575	20,935,535	406,848,110
Peace and Order				48,581,253	48,581,253
Transportation				2,931,426	2,931,426
Local Governance and Peacebuilding	99,000,000	218,226,338	200,735,000		517,961,338
Peace and Order	99,000,000	5,422,000	133,000,000		237,422,000
Defense and Security		54,967,000	67,735,000		122,702,000
Peacebuilding		49,900,020			49,900,020
Local Governance		107,937,318			107,937,318
Social Services	3,140,855,500	2,333,932,250	252,039,050	294,538,764	6,021,365,564
Humanitarian Aid	3,005,000,000	2,286,060,365			5,291,060,365
Health	135,855,500		244,850,500		380,706,000
Education		44,041,885	4,930,550	3,276,800	52,249,235
Youth		1,408,000			1,408,000
Youth, Mental Health, Psychosocial Services		2,422,000	2,258,000		4,680,000
Livelihood				291,261,964	291,261,964
Land Resources Management		565,371,564	451,305,000	175,507,573	1,192,184,137
Land Resources Management, Solid Waste Management, Debris Management		565,371,564	52,315,000		617,686,564
Solid Waste Management			398,990,000	175,507,573	574,497,573
Cross Sectoral		450,000			450,000
Government		450,000			450,000
Others	23,248,247	73,465,536	26,853,667		123,567,450
Government (Communications)	23,248,247	73,465,536	26,853,667		123,567,450

Source: iLEAD Supplementary Research

3.3.2 MAA projects

From the original vision of ‘total rehabilitation’ expressed by Sec. Del Rosario and the various designs produced through the ‘unsolicited proposals’ from Bangon Marawi Consortium and PowerChina, the TFBM was forced to break down the original MAA contract into 22 separate rehabilitation components in October 2018.¹⁰² At that point, TFBM expressed the desire that 14 of these projects

could be procured through negotiated procurement, while eight may be implemented through a joint venture agreement.¹⁰³ However, all of these projects shifted to negotiated procurement later on. Figure 21 compares two GANTT charts presented by Sec. del Rosario to the public, which shows how the list of 22 priority infrastructure projects was stratified based on ‘priority’ tiers.



From the original plan of groundbreaking in early-to-mid-2018, only two components were procured by year-end 2018. These are the PHP 75 million contract for the first component (debris clearing and management) awarded to FINMAT International Resources, Incorporated (FIRI)—the intended local partner of PowerChina based on initial procurement negotiations, and the master development planning outsourced by NHA.^{104,105} There was substantial progress in debris clearing by December 2019, although some issues remain.

Table 6 from the Special Committee on Marawi report provides updates on each of the twenty infrastructure projects underway as of June 2020. At least two projects—the convention center and Agus River promenade—that were supposed to be handled by DPWH using funding from the Government of China have been canceled thus far.

According to news releases, groundbreaking for Marawi City Jail and the Grand Padian Market was conducted in December 2019.¹⁰⁶ A school building—that was originally scheduled for the third quarter of 2019

according to a November 2019 TFBM report—had its groundbreaking in July 2020.¹⁰⁷


Figures 24 and 25 in the section on foreign aids identify larger loan-funded projects executed by DPWH through ADB-JICA projects and agreements with China. However, only the ADB-JICA infrastructure project is visible on the ground as of present writing.

TFBM has secured PHP 105 million donations needed to reconstruct the Dansalan Bato Ali Masjid, which was demolished in July 2020.¹⁰⁸ TFBM has also announced the rebuilding of Masjid Darussalam in Barangay Raya Madaya, Masjid Disomangcop in Barangay Daguduban, and the White Mosque in Barangay Lumba Madaya. However, there is no available information regarding the precise source of funds, which TFBM reported was financed by donations from private developers.¹⁰⁹

Figure 21. Master Development Plan Timeline and Costs (May 2019 vs June 2020)

MASTER DEVELOPMENT PLAN PROJECT TIMELINE AND COSTS																	
ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	Implementing Agency	2018		2019				2020				2021			
				4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
1st PRIORITY																	
1.1	DEBRIS MANAGEMENT	2,300,000,000.00	NHA														
1.2	MASTER DEVELOPMENT PLAN	10,854,720.00	NHA														
1.3	SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT	650,000,000.00	LWUA														
1.4	PORT FACILITIES	687,214,800.00	PPA														
1.5	LAND ACQUISITION	400,000,000.00	NHA														
1.6	GRAND PADIAN MARKET	443,250,000.00	LGU														
1.7	HOSPITAL WITH BASIC EQUIPMENT	586,180,447.32	DOH														
1.8	BARANGAY COMPLEX	335,174,400	LGU														
1.9	SCHOOL BUILDING	657,873,600.00	DPWH														
1.10	LWUA BULK WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM (LAA)	225,000,000.00	LWUA														
2nd PRIORITY																	
2.1	ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE	4,768,500,000.00	NHA														
2.2	PROMENADE	446,860,000.00	DPWH														
2.3	MARITIME HEADQUARTERS	49,250,000.00	PNP														
2.4	HALAL SLAUGHTERHOUSE	47,161,800.00	DA-NMS														
2.5	MULTI-LEVEL CAR PARK	178,200,000.00	DOTr														
2.6	PROTECTIVE FACILITIES	186,786,329.81	PNP														
3rd PRIORITY																	
3.1	CONVENTION CENTER	650,000,000.00	NHA														
3.2	PEACE MEMORIAL PARK	312,255,383.00	LGU														
3.3	PRESERVATION OF HISTORICAL SITES	48,000,000.00	LGU														
3.4	MULTI MODAL TRANSPORT HUB	37,500,000.00	DOTr														
3.5	SCHOOL OF LIVING TRADITION	53,757,900.00	LGU														
3.6	MARAWI MUSEUM	44,436,000.00	LGU														
GRAND TOTAL		13,118,255,380.13															





MARAWI PROJECT TIMELINE

(as of 3 June 2020)

ITEM NO.	PROJECT	Implementing Agency	DURATION (Months)	2018-2019	2020				2021			
					1st Q	2nd Q	3rd Q	4th Q	1st Q	2nd Q	3rd Q	4th Q
1st PRIORITY												
1.1	DEBRIS MANAGEMENT	NHA	11									
1.2	MASTER DEVELOPMENT PLAN	NHA	3									
1.3	SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT	LWUA	18									
1.4	PORT FACILITIES	PPA	11									
1.5	LAND ACQUISITION	NHA	6									
1.6	GRAND PADIAN MARKET	LGU	18									
1.7	HOSPITAL WITH BASIC EQUIPMENT	DOH	10									
1.8	BARANGAY COMPLEX	LGU	18									
1.9	SCHOOL BUILDING	DPWH	18									
1.10	LWUA BULK WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM (LAA)	LWUA	16									
2nd PRIORITY												
2.1	ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE WITH UNDERGROUND FACILITIES	NHA	12									
2.2	PROMENADE	LGU	12									
2.3	MARITIME GROUP BUILDING	PNP	13									
2.4	HALAL SLAUGHTERHOUSE	DA-NMIS	9									
2.5	MULTI-LEVEL CAR PARK	DOTr	10									
2.6	PROTECTIVE FACILITIES											
	2.6.1 TOURIST POLICE BUILDING	PNP	8									
	2.6.2 FIRE STATION		10									
	2.6.3 CORRECTIONAL FACILITY		10									
3rd PRIORITY												
3.1	CONVENTION CENTER											
3.2	PEACE MEMORIAL PARK	LGU	18									
3.3	PRESERVATION OF HISTORICAL SITES	LGU	10									
3.4	MULTI MODAL TRANSPORT HUB	DOTr	6									
3.5	SCHOOL OF LIVING TRADITION	LGU	10									
3.6	MARAWI MUSEUM	LGU	6									

Source: TFBM,2018 ¹¹⁰

Table 6. Status of MAA Projects (as of July 2020)

Vertical infrastructures	Implementing agency	Remarks
Jail facility	Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On-going construction Completion date: June 8, 2021
Fire station	Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) / Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Awarded to 4JY'S Construction Awaiting Notice to Proceed
Grand Padian Central Market	Marawi LGU	Construction started on June 20, 2020
Peace memorial park	Marawi LGU	No actual start date
Barangay complex with health center and madrasah	Marawi LGU	No actual start date but four out of 24 barangays are prioritized: Lumbaca Madaya, Sangkay Dansalan, Datu Naga, and West Marinaut
School of Living Tradition	Marawi LGU	No actual start date
Marawi museum	Marawi LGU	No actual start date
Tourist police building	Philippine National Police (PNP)	Awaiting revised procurement timeline
Maritime building	Philippine National Police (PNP)	Awaiting revised procurement timeline
Port facilities with wharves recovery	Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No update Refers only to preliminary engineering activities
School building (1 building)	Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) / Department of Education (DepEd)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Awarded to 4JY'S Construction Awaiting Notice to Proceed



Vertical infrastructures	Implementing agency	Remarks
School buildings (9 buildings)	Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) / Department of Education (DepEd)	Awaiting detailed engineering plan and cost estimate to initiate budget request
Halal slaughter house	Department of Agriculture (DA) - National Meat Inspection Service (NMIS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Approved by the Office of the President on June 19, 2020 Awaiting SARO from DBM
Hospital with basic equipment		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lacking documents which stalled OCD's endorsement of project Marawi LGU has not issued Certificate of Land Availability
Lake Lanao promenade	Marawi LGU (originally DPWH)	Submitted project work plan and revised budget of 442.4 million pesos
Agus river promenade	Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)	Cancelled (as of June 3, 2020)
Multi-modal transport hub	Department of Transportation (DoTr)	For 2021 proposed funding
Multi-level carpark	Department of Transportation (DoTr)	For 2021 proposed funding
Port facilities (civil work)	Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)	On-going procurement of preliminary engineering activities
Convention center	Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)	Cancelled

Source: SCM and Baunto, 2020 ¹¹¹

3.3.3 Housing Projects

Given the extended delays, housing for the displaced families must be further prioritized. Table 7 shows available information regarding temporary shelter sites, which only support a fraction of the affected families. Based on TFBM reports, a total of 2,986 units in transitory shelters were occupied as of 9 July 2020 (see Table 7). IDPs residing in these shelters face numerous challenges. In particular, those in temporary shelters in Sagonsongan face imminent displacement because of the five-year limit on the land lease.¹¹² Moreover, the temporary shelter sites are located in hazard-prone areas in the city's outskirts,

causing high transport costs for IDPs who need to purchase food or work in the urban center. They are also plagued by the lack of access to potable water and sanitation, which are further aggravated by the pandemic.¹¹³

On the other hand, permanent shelters are only provided for families displaced by the road widening projects in the MAA (see Figure 22). Ongoing challenges experienced by IDP families in the shelter sites and elsewhere are further discussed in Section 4.




Table 7. Status of TFBM-NHA Temporary Shelter in Marawi City (as of 9 July 2020)

Temporary shelter sites	Total target no. of units	Total no. of units completed	Total no. of units turned over and occupied	Total no. of units under different stages of construction	Physical accomplishment	
					Land development	Housing construction
Sagonsongan	1,052	1,052	1,052	-	100.0%	100.0%
Sagonsongan (additional units)	300	257	22	43	16.2%	76.2%
Boganga	1,500	900	707	600	52.8%	69.4%
Rorogagus	1,000	350	191	650	Site 1: 52.0%	Site 1: -
					Site 2: 72.9%	Site 2: 48%
Dulay	1,000	64	-	936	19.9%	11.8%
Sub-total	4,852	2,623	1,972	2,229	55.5%	60.2%
Transitory shelters implemented by other partners	-	1,014	1,014	-	-	-
Total	4,852	3,637	2,986	2,229		

Source: Baunto, 2020¹¹⁴; Special Committee on Marawi, 2020¹¹⁵



Figure 22. Summary of Progress on Housing Projects for Marawi Rehabilitation Efforts

 HOUSING PROJECTS								
HOUSING PROJECT	TEMPORARY SHELTERS					PERMANENT SHELTERS		TOTAL
	Sagonsongan	Sagonsongan (Additional 300 Units)	Lake View Shelter	Rorogagus (Site 1 & 2)	Dulay	Pamayandeg sa Ranaw Residences (Phase 1-4)	Papandayan Low Rise Bldg (Phase 1)	
Location	Brgy. Sagonsongan, Marawi City	Brgy. Sagonsongan, Marawi City	Brgy. Boganga, Marawi City	Brgy. Rorogagus, Marawi City	Brgy. Dulay, Marawi City	Brgy. Kilala and Gadongan, Marawi City	Brgy. Papandayan, Marawi City	
Land Area	14 ha	3 ha	15 ha	10 ha	15 ha	39 ha	0.7 ha	96.7 ha
No. of Units	1,052 Units	300 Units	1,500 Units	1,000 Units	1,000 Units	2,000 Units	80	6,932 Units
Start date	November 2017	April 2019	September 2018	September 2018	April 2019	April 2019	May 2020	
End date	March 2018	180 Calendar Days	July 1, 2019	July 1, 2019	March 2020	March 2020		
Project Cost	168.32M	90M	495M	213M	335M	Land Acquisition: 117.8M Land Development: 540M Permanent Shelter: 2,000 (SMF)		2.072 B
Land Dev't	100%	Earthworks	23.27%	Site 1: 42.71% Site 2: 30.68%	Earthworks	Earthworks		
Housing	100%		41.89%					
Remarks	Fully Occupied With Individual Certificate of Acceptance.	On-Going Land Development Works. Downloaded 50% of Funds to LGU for TS & Land Dev. Implemented by LGU Marawi	556 TS Units turned over to LGU date January 17, 2019. Downloaded 50% of Funds to LGU for TS & Land Dev. Implemented by LGU Marawi	On-going Concrete Slab for TS Downloaded 50% of Funds to LGU for TS & Land Dev. Implemented by LGU Province	Downloaded 50% of Funds to LGU for TS & Land Dev. Implemented by LGU Marawi	On-Going Survey Works, Land Development Implemented by LGU Marawi and PGLDS	For issuance of NTP	

Source: TFBM, 2019¹¹⁶

Summary of Built Transitory Shelters

(as of **June 15, 2020**)

PROJECT	NUMBER OF UNITS			EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE
	BUILT	ONGOING	OCCUPIED	
Sagonsongan Transitory Shelter Site	1,052	0	1,052	N/A
Sagonsongan Transitory Shelter Site II (Area 8)	245	55	0	June 30, 2020
Lake View Transitory Shelter Site (Boganga)	900	600	707	June 30, 2020
Rorogagus Transitory Shelter Site (Sites 1 & 2)	350	550	191	June 30, 2020
Dulay Transitory Shelter Site	50	950	0	Sept. 30, 2020
Transitory Shelters implemented by Development Partners	1,014	--	1,014	N/A
GRAND TOTAL:	3,511	2,255	2,964	

Source: Excerpts from 2019 NHA Report¹¹⁷



3.4 What has been committed by donors?

Donor investments are much harder to track. A rapid exercise conducted by iLEAD aimed to address this information gap and some of the results are shown in Tables 8-10. Their analysis estimated a grand total of PHP 40.11 billion of foreign aid committed by various humanitarian and development agencies, although it is unclear if all of these loans and grants have indeed pushed through or were fully disbursed in Marawi. A considerable portion of these come in foreign loans calculated at PHP 28.428 billion (Table 8).

A smaller fraction includes grants and other larger existing programs that pivoted to include a Marawi component (Table 9 and 10). While ADB and JICA were able to provide large packages by working with DPWH for priority infrastructure, a proposed multi-donor Marawi Reconstruction Trust Fund to be administered by the World Bank reached the design stage by early 2019 but did not prosper.¹¹⁸


Humanitarian expenditure per sector is available through the reports consolidated by UN OCHA and the

Mindanao Humanitarian Team but is not exhaustive. Part of the challenge is that coordination amongst multilateral and bilateral partners is spotty, although they tend to work with the same local subgrantees.

Another layer of information that should be assessed is private-sector donations, including those coursed through NGOs such as Philippine Business for Social Progress and Kaya Natin/Angat Buhay. To bridge the significant gaps in livelihood support (to be discussed further in Section 4), various social enterprises have also sprung up involving Maranao textiles, handicrafts, and food.

The Marawi crisis also triggered heavy donor investments to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). However, there is no existing comprehensive evaluation of these projects or formal reports regarding the implementation of the 2019 National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism,¹¹⁹ which has been launched but has purportedly not been widely circulated publicly due to COVID-19 restrictions.¹²⁰ ●


Figure 23. Proposed Cultural Infrastructure for China funding



Source: Special Committee on Marawi, 2020¹²¹



Figure 24. DPWH-ADB-JICA Reconstruction and Development Projects



Source: Special Committee on Marawi, 2020¹²²

Table 8. Foreign Aid in Loans

Institution	Project Title	Cost in Million pesos	Implementing / Recipient Agencies, if identified	Sector
ADB	Emergency Assistance for Reconstruction and Recovery of Marawi, Component 1: Quick disbursing support for Marawi Recovery (2018-2022)	15,534	DOF, DepEd, DOH, DSWD	Governance and Institutions Development; Social Development
	Emergency Assistance for Reconstruction and Recovery of Marawi: Civil Works (2018-2024; loan + PH counterpart)	6,835	DOF, DPWH	Governance and Institutions Development; Infrastructure
China	Marawi Rehabilitation - Bridge and Bypass Project	998.7	DPWH, HUDCC	Infrastructure
World Bank	Marawi Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (FY 2021-22) Project under Country Partnership Framework 2019-2023	5,060		
SUBTOTAL		28,428		

Source: iLEAD Supplementary Research



Table 9. Foreign Aid in Grants

Institution	Project Title	Cost in Million pesos	Implementing / Recipient Agencies, if identified	Sector
ADB	Grant: Emergency Assistance for Reconstruction and Recovery of Marawi Component 3: Restoring water utilities (2019-2020)	243.1	LWUA, DOH	Social Reform and Community Development
	Grant: Output 4: Social Services and Livelihood Support (from Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction; 2019-2021)	145.9	DOLE, DPWH, DTI, DepEd	
EU	Grant: Mindanao Peace and Development Program-Peace and Development in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	287.28	DOF	
UN - World Food Programme	Immediate Response Emergency Operation for people affected by armed conflict in Marawi (2017)	23.97	ARMM	Social Reform and Community Development
UNDP	Financial inclusion for the recovery of Marawi	15.95	Donor-implemented	Social Reform and Community Development
UN Habitat; Government of Japan	Project for Rebuilding Marawi through Community-Driven Shelter and Livelihood Support	545.32	Donor-implemented	Social Reform and Community Development
UN - FAO	Marawi Recovery Project: Support for Enhancing Agriculture-based livelihoods of Internally Displaced Farmers Affected by the Marawi Conflict	40.93	DA	Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, and Natural Resources
JICA	Road Network Development Project in Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao: Marawi City Ring Road	1,759	DPWH	
	Grant: Support for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Marawi City and Its Surrounding Areas	631	DPWH	
	Programme for the Support for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Marawi City and its Surrounding Areas	940.8	DOF	Social Reform and Community Development
	Reconstruction and Development Plan for Greater Marawi	970	DPWH	
USAID	Marawi Response Project	1,328.75	LGU	Governance and Institutions Development
USAID	Support to People Displaced by the Marawi Conflict - Early Recovery	322.09	Catholic Relief Services;	Governance and Institutions Development
	Emergency Basic Intervention for IDPs affected by Marawi Conflict	263.09	Action Against Hunger-Spain;	Governance and Institutions Development
	Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the Displaced People of Marawi	263.09	Action Against Hunger-Spain;	Governance and Institutions Development
DFAT-Australia	Response and Recovery Assistance for Marawi	1,048		
China	Donation - Heavy equipment for the rehabilitation and rebuilding of Marawi City	153.8	DPWH	Infrastructure
AECID (Spain)	Strengthening professional competencies, civic commitment and employability of the youth and displaced women in Marawi and Zamboanga	34.55	Humanismo y Democracia	Governance and Institutions Development
SUBTOTAL		9,016.62		

Source: iLEAD Supplementary Research



Table 10. Foreign Aid in Grants with a Marawi Component

Institution	Project Title	Cost in Million pesos	Implementing / Recipient Agencies, if identified	Sector
	<i>Mindanao Trust Fund (EU, DFAT, Spain)</i>	<i>unknown</i>		
World Bank	<i>Mindanao Trust Fund (EU)</i>	<i>727.62</i>	<i>Bangsamoro Development Agency; CFSI</i>	<i>Governance and Institutions Development</i>
	<i>Mindanao Trust Fund (Spain)</i>	<i>58.99</i>		<i>Governance and Institutions Development</i>
	<i>Mindanao Trust Fund (additional funding)</i>	<i>170.08</i>		<i>Governance and Institutions Development</i>
USAID	<i>Development Credit Authority Loan Portfolio Guarantee for 1st Valley Bank</i>	<i>34.55</i>	<i>SMEs in Mindanao, including Marawi</i>	<i>Industry, Trade, and Tourism</i>
	<i>Integrated Maternal, Neonatal, Child Health and Nutrition/Family Planning Regional Projects</i>	<i>1,617.89</i>	<i>DOH</i>	<i>Social Reform and Community Development</i>
	<i>Applying Binding, Bonding, and Bridging for Peace Program</i>	<i>60.6</i>	<i>MINDA</i>	<i>Governance and Institutions Development</i>
SUBTOTAL		2,669.73		

Note: There is no publicly available disaggregated data on how much was spent on Marawi rehabilitation support by MTF, USAID, and other existing donor programs. Amounts cited here are total allocations from donors but disbursements for Marawi are not specified.

Source: iLEAD Supplementary Research





4. Tracking and responding to technical issues and community concerns

This section briefly outlines the significant challenges affecting displaced communities several years after the Marawi crisis. While various sectoral reports exist, this review provides a technical overview of the most important interlocking areas of concern that require priority intervention—areas that, for various reasons, have major gaps that have not been fully addressed to this date. These are: (1) the built environment, covering land, housing, and property rights and impacts to the environment; (2) social welfare issues including but not limited to health, education, and social protection; (3) livelihood; (4) security, justice, and social cohesion; (5) cultural sensitivity; and (6) access to information.

While these issues are nominally within the purview of TFBM and its plans, several external factors have exacerbated the gaps discussed in the following sections. Some of these factors include the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, changing priorities and funding levels, and donor fatigue. Neither comprehensive and publicly available information nor purposive and evidence-driven multi-sectoral efforts exist for the monitoring and evaluation of Marawi rehabilitation programs. As such, designing targeted responses to complex challenges remains difficult. These gaps also burden the conflict-affected population who have limited information or control over the programs meant to alleviate their suffering, which lead to a prevalent perception of mismanagement and even corruption in the Marawi rehabilitation efforts.

4.1 Physical Environment

4.1.1 Housing, Land, and Property

Figure 25 shows an infographic from Fernandez, Garcia, and Baunto's 2018 analysis, illustrating how concerns affecting Marawi's displaced populations manifest at provincial, municipal, and district MAA scales. Though this analysis was made more than two years ago, these issues largely remain unresolved.

The decision to 'build back better' and completely reconfigure the MAA's spatial form entails the automatic displacement of several families to give way to the infrastructure programs. While the MAA itself is heavily titled, TFBM Subcommittee on Land assessments cited in official documents including the Special Committee on Marawi report acknowledge that at least 50% of MAA residents have no 'clean' titles¹²³ and at least 50% of MAA residents will be affected by the new roads and infrastructure.¹²⁴ Figure 26 shows the last cadastral survey for the MAA. The BTC-SCM report notes that the Marawi City Assessor's Office has identified seven major land-related problems in the 24 most-affected barangays:¹²⁵

1. Multiple claimants of the same property. This emanates from overlapping titles under the Dansalan Cadastre (Q-124), Dansalan Townsite (K-3), and an approved survey
2. Undocumented transaction of Absolute Deed of Sale
3. Unnotarized sale agreement of elders (*Kapasadän o manga lokës sa kapäsa-e*)
4. Non-annotation of mother title of any encumbrances, when it was, in fact, already subdivided into several claims
5. Surviving heirs' non-recognition of new ownership of property sold by their deceased parent/s, who were the original owner of the property, to the new and present owner
6. Double sale
7. Homeowner who built his/her house on a land by mere accommodation of the deceased landowner



ISSUES PER SCALE

Lanao Del Sur

Economic and social impact of Marawi displacement; impact on secondary centers; environmental issues, e.g. Lake Lanao resource management; security hotspots; clarifying institutional agreements and mandates for service delivery at the national, regional, provincial, and local scale

Marawi City

Proper location of projects; lack of available land; ensuring cultural grounding, respect for traditional practices; sensitivity to conflict; tenurial rights; social impacts of new projects; compensation; meaningful deliberation and dialogue; clarifying rationale behind buffer areas and no-build zones

Main Affected Area (MAA)

Assessment and mapping of tenurial rights and markers; clearing and management of unexploded ordnance and debris; private burial grounds; traditional practices on land; proper treatment for non-voters and informal settlers; managing negative perceptions about new projects; compensation regarding rights-of-way, looting, and damage to private property

Marawi City Indicative Land Classification

- city boundary
- forestland
- military reservation
- Mindanao State University
- power plant
- provincial capitol and civic center
- group of barangays with any portion that was part of the Main Affected Area (MAA)

NOTE

(1) "MAA" means "Most Affected Area".


(2) The whole city is placed under the Lake Lanao Watershed Reservation.

SOURCE OF DATA

DENR-ARMM

SOURCES
Administrative boundaries are from NCR/MAC-MTWG and subject to validation. Issues were from the workshops about the Issues for December and February 2018.

Figure 26. Cadastral survey



Addressing issues related to land ownership requires sensitivity due to overlapping claims premised on different systems. These premises span across various layers of informal and traditional ownership claims, some of which are attributed triggers of horizontal communal conflict (*rido*). However, the Philippine government does not formally acknowledge these claims essentially enacting a form of marginalization through state-sponsored land dispossession—a reason acknowledged as a primary cause of the Bangsamoro struggle.^{128,129}

These issues are compounded by the ongoing demolitions. Multiple families have refused to give

consent because unilateral government expropriation is incompatible with their clans' traditional housing, land, and property decision-making practices. Figure 27 below shows a series of photos posted by a Marawi resident on Facebook complaining about looting and demolition without consent. Even among those who permitted demolishing their homes, there were reported complaints about sales of debris without consent in 2020. Although the TFBM and the local government of Marawi assured residents that a trust fund would be created for the benefit of the residents,¹³⁰ the lack of transparency regarding the process of decision-making intensified general dissatisfaction with the government's management.

Figure 27. Citizen complaints regarding demolition without consent



Source: Photos taken in 2018 by residents of Brgy. Daguduban, Marawi City. Permission to publish secured.

Thus, the results from Kathangombalay and Social Cartography activities must be reconciled with adjustments due to the new Marawi CLUP and the proposed sites for the priority infrastructure, which were designed without factoring in these land-related issues.

Figures 14 and 16 from the previous section showed how the TFBM-identified public priority infrastructure and proposed exclusionary zoning regime would require the expropriation of land in the most heavily-populated areas, particularly those around the lakeside that have been



earmarked for the new market, and several other public buildings. In June 2021, Marawi residents denounced on social media what they perceived to be ‘land grabbing’ in the four lakeside barangays of Sabala Manao, Dansalan, Datu sa Dansalan, and Datu Naga.¹³¹ A particular sticking point is the status of land that were reclaimed from Lake Lanao and are owned by the City Government. Other residents contest this status, saying that their families had done the dumping and reclamation of foreshore areas over decades.¹³²

A land dispute arbitration committee headed by Mayor Gandamra of Marawi City and Parliament Member Hamid Barra of the BTA Ministry of Human Settlements was mandated to address these claims in partnership with the TFBM’s Subcommittee on Land headed by the national Department of Environment and Natural Resources, but was only provided funding by the national government in May 2021. It is unclear if the BTA’s Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, and Energy (MENRE) will also be involved in the committee activities.¹³³

Even outside the MAA, the lack of readily available ‘clean’ land with no potential conflicts has led to delays in securing parcels for temporary and permanent housing. As previously discussed, the usufruct arrangement for the sizeable Sagonsongan site is valid only for five years; afterward, ownership of the land reverts to the private-sector owner. As for permanent shelters, approximately 3,500 units were targeted for implementation, including 2,000 permanent shelters by the NHA in Barangays Gadongan and Kilala, and 1,500 units implemented by the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC) and UN-Habitat in Barangay Dulay Proper.¹³⁴ The first turnover of permanent shelters was on February 2021 for 109 families,¹³⁵ followed by another 170 units in July 2021.¹³⁶ Both were funded by the Japanese Government and UN Habitat.¹³⁷ These shelter projects provide interim stop-gap measures, but the current TFBM plans or government funding allocations will not allow support for the actual reconstruction of destroyed homes in the MAA, due to the aforementioned policy decision that government funds could not be used for rebuilding or replacing private goods.¹³⁸

As of early 2021, residents in less-damaged sectors of the MAA have been allowed to return and rebuild their homes using their own funds if they are able to secure a building permit from the LGU and can prove land ownership. However, taking out bank loans and incurring

debt is not a palatable or realistic option for citizens whose communities were destroyed by military bombing and shelling. An April 2019 statement by Pres. Duterte hinting that he would rather leave Marawi reconstruction to affluent Maranao businessmen¹³⁹ has struck fear in residents whose assets and livelihoods were lost in the siege. It is hoped that the passage of the pending Marawi Compensation Bill can help residents pay for the rebuilding of their homes.¹⁴⁰

Various issues related to publicly-funded temporary and permanent shelters include the lack of transparency regarding the selection criteria applied by the TFBM to qualify IDPs for temporary housing; the aforementioned remoteness of the sites that cause high transport costs and pertinent barriers to accessing water, energy, markets, and livelihood; and the unforeseen effects of small, one one-size-fits-all designs for shelter projects. As highlighted in the Special Committee on Marawi report and previous civil society assessments, the shelters are arguably small to fit the average family in MAAs and provide safe spaces to individuals, particularly women. Based on the 2015 PSA Census of Population and Housing, the average family in Marawi is comprised of 6 to 7 members.¹⁴¹ The common Maranao practice of shared housing among multiple sub-households and extended families further challenges the shelter limits and creates additional vulnerabilities for women and girls who have less space to retain modesty. Thus, some IDPs who have been assigned temporary shelters but have other housing options opted to rent out their shelter units for PHP 2,000 per month. The BTA has since committed to providing housing projects to IDPs with at least three rooms in compliance with Islamic injunctions.¹⁴² Meanwhile, other families are still waiting for opportunities to be provided shelter—a mismatch that caused dissatisfaction about the management of housing support.

Across the board, contesting information regarding Marawi’s land area and the overlapping of multiple tenurial claims presents a fundamental challenge to rehabilitations. As with other local governments in the Philippines, land area computation tends to be bloated due to the negative incentive of land as a factor in Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). In the absence of an updated cadastral survey of BARMM’s political boundaries, reported land area for the city ranges from a high of 11,176.00 hectares as reported in the draft Module 1 CLUP outputs of Marawi LGU in 2017; 8,404.09 hectares as reflected in the DENR-ARMM cadastral map; to a low of 5,838 hectares as indicated in the 1972 Marawi City master plan.¹⁴³



There are outstanding calls for the disposition of Campo Ranao military reservation Camp Keithley (or Camp Amai Pakpak) within the military reservation established under Presidential Proclamation (PP) 453 (s. 1953),¹⁴⁴ which covers sections of Marawi City, Saguilaran, Piagapo, and Marantao. The Marawi campus of the Mindanao State University overlaps with this reservation (PP 806, s. 1961¹⁴⁵), while other parcels similarly covered by other presidential proclamations include the civic center and provincial capitol (PP 375, s. 1953¹⁴⁶); the NPC Agus hydroelectric power plant (PP 1354, s. 1974¹⁴⁷); and the Lanao Peoples Park (PP 922, s. 1992¹⁴⁸). PP 871 (s. 1992)¹⁴⁹ also created the Lake Lanao Watershed, covering 26 municipalities across Lanao del Sur. PP 439 (s. 1994)¹⁵⁰ also established the MSU Housing project within the PP 806, allocating 9.652 hectares for low-cost housing for MSU employees.

In line with this, Marawi City has been identified as a priority area for the implementation of Executive Order No. 75, series of 2019, which directs government agencies led by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to identify unused government land for distribution to ‘qualified beneficiaries.’^{151, 152} It should be noted, however, that Camp Keithley does not include land in the MAA. A separate challenge lies in the optics of the government’s decision to purchase land inside the MAA to build a new military outpost on a high plot of land formerly owned by the Carmelite Missionaries in Brgy. Kapantaran—site of the old Marawi City Hall. While TFBM has defended this decision by saying that Marawi’s security must be ensured,¹⁵³ the perception of prioritizing militarization over helping residents return has not been accepted well by citizen observers.

4.1.2 Environmental Impacts and DRRM

Marawi City sits on the shore of Lake Lanao, one of the oldest lakes in the Philippines.¹⁵⁴ It is the largest lake in Mindanao and the second largest lake in the Philippines after Laguna de Bay.¹⁵⁵ The Agus River – Lake Lanao Watershed, classified as a protected area, has a major environmental, economic, and cultural significance not only for Lanao del Sur but for the BARMM and the Philippines as a whole. It also serves as the water source of the Agus Hydroelectric Power Plant (HEPP) system,¹⁵⁶ and two of its installations (Agus I and Agus II) are situated within the province of Lanao del Sur.¹⁵⁷

The creation of the Agus HEPP caused significant effects on the lake’s ecosystem, leading to threats and even extinction of many endemic fishes.¹⁵⁸ Any potential projects such as the proposed landfill and wastewater treatment plant in Brgy. Malimono^{159,160} and the now-canceled lakeside promenade,¹⁶¹ which was intended to include the use of rubble for reclamation, will further damage the river’s biological systems if not appropriately handled.

Hazard vulnerability is a threat to IDP families because most of the temporary shelters were constructed in remote and high-elevation locations. This vulnerability was observed in the aftermath of 2017 typhoon Vinta, when several IDP camps that were located on flood planes were inundated and house-based IDPs located in municipalities around Lake Lanao were affected by floods and rock landslides.¹⁶² In June 2020, 20 IDP families in the Boganga temporary shelter were also hit by landslides caused by a period of heavy rainfalls.^{163,164}


Figure 28. Landslide and earthquake vulnerability



Source: Fernandez, Garcia, and Baunto, 2018¹⁶⁵



Figure 29. Landslides in Madalum after Typhoon Vinta



Source: Fernandez, 2019¹⁶⁶

4.2 Access to Basic Services

The targeting and distance issues described at length in previous sections translate to difficulties in accessing basic social services, particularly for home-based IDPs and those not included in the Kathanon biometrics profiling. The Special Committee on Marawi report notes that while PHP 73,000 in cash assistance was provided by DSWD, delays in the rollout and the uneven provision of social protection packages further caused dissatisfaction among displaced residents.¹⁶⁷

The following discussions examine relevant service provision challenges, particularly those concerning WaSH, health, energy, and education.

4.2.1 Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WaSH)

Access to safe drinking water and providing water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities (WaSH) for every family has been an issue even before the Marawi siege. The lack of access to clean water worsened due to the destruction of pumping facilities and outdated distribution pipelines serving the city during the war and has yet to be replaced.¹⁶⁸

The MHT WASH Cluster expressed serious concerns regarding the lack of adequate sanitation and waste treatment measures in the transitory shelter sites. Septic tanks in several areas have either overflowed or been found to be discharging wastewater into uncovered or open drainage canals. The proximity of septic tanks to the lake table also makes these areas a potential conduit for diarrhea and cholera outbreaks.¹⁶⁹ These issues are particularly salient with the COVID-19 pandemic, which also hit Lanao del Sur early on.¹⁷⁰

These remote and high-elevation resettlement sites also lack access to safe water. After more than two years, the Sagonsongan transitory site is now being served by a well constructed by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). However, other families in temporary shelter sites need to purchase drinking water by the gallon, and water for washing is still trucked in at least three times a week at public cost. Some international and local NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Action Against Hunger, supplemented the TFBM efforts with additional servicing of tank trucks.¹⁷¹ The situation is worse in community-managed evacuation centers outside Marawi City.



Computations by Baunto cited in the Marawi SCM report estimate the unmet need for safe water as follows:

The total demand for potable water, while not available during the series of consultations in Marawi, can be extrapolated from the available data of various sources. According to the TFBM, a total of 2,986 units in transitory shelters were occupied, as of July 9, 2020. It is safe to assume that one occupied dwelling unit corresponds to one family so that, at least, 2,986 families currently reside in transitory shelters. If the recommended basic water-consumption requirement per person is at least 50 liters per day to maintain proper hygiene and good health,⁵ then the estimated demand for potable water of the IDP families (for an average family size of 6.6) in transitory shelter is at least 29,561 cubic meters, or 29.561 million liters, per month. Similarly, the demand for potable water for the 218 families in the community-managed evacuation centers is roughly 2,158 cubic meters or 2.158 million liters per month.^{172,173}

While some IDP families attempted to return to less-damaged parts of the MAA, such as barangays Tolali and Daguduban, delays in the rollout of essential infrastructures such as water pipelines, electricity poles, cables, sanitation, and road network make it difficult for people to stay. While the MCWD is still working on procuring a permanent supply system as of July 2020, temporary water pumps are in use in the 24 barangays of the MAA.^{174,175}

4.2.2 Access to Health Services

Although the Amai Pakpak Hospital survived the siege, numerous barangay health stations and private clinics were either completely destroyed or partially damaged by the war. There is also limited information available about current health risks faced by IDP families. Only some partial reports regarding morbidity and mortality during the early months of the crisis exist, particularly for families stranded in evacuation centers. Gaps in mental health support are a significant issue affecting families, given the uncertainties about their return to their proper homes.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is also a relevant health risk to IDPs, who had difficulties securing food and water and enforcing minimum health standards in evacuation centers.¹⁷⁶ The current COVID-19 isolation facility for Marawi City is also located in Sagonsongan near the IDP temporary shelter sites.¹⁷⁷

4.2.3 Access to Energy

Lack of stable electrification is still an issue for Marawi and Lanao del Sur residents despite having the Agus Hydroelectric Powerplant—a significant source of electricity for the entire Mindanao.

All temporary shelters in the Sagonsongan site are connected to a local electricity grid, but a substantial number of units in other temporary shelter sites have not been energized. As reported in the Special Committee on Marawi report, about 80% of the temporary shelter units in Dulay, 67% in Rorogagus, and 10% in Boganga were not yet energized as of February 2020. According to the Lanao del Sur Electric Cooperative (LASURECO), the Dulay and Rorogagus temporary shelters must be completed before installing electrical connections. These sites are dependent on solar streetlights provided by donors such as USAID, MinDA, and the Pepsi Foundation.¹⁷⁸

The report also pointed that the installation of cables and electric poles was hampered by delays in the preparation of a master plan by the TFBM Subcommittee on Land and NHA and by issues concerning property ownership and right of way. In the meantime, LASURECO and National Electrification Administration (NEA) have upgraded the 20-mega volt power substations in Ganassi and Tugaya to supplement the substation in Marawi City, which single-handedly supplied a majority of Lanao del Sur's northern municipalities in the past.¹⁷⁹

4.2.4 Access to Education

The 2017 siege destroyed 22 public elementary and secondary schools in the MAA, which had a combined enrolment of about 12,000 students. While the DepEd's *Oplan Balik Eskwela* worked on twinning and pairing schools, there is no available tracking data on these 12,000 displaced students. Some of them out-migrated to other parts of the country with their families, others dropped out, and a few may have perished during the siege.



In the meantime, four DepEd-run temporary schools have been set up within the transitory shelter sites:¹⁸⁰

- Marawi Sagonsongan Central Elementary School (with 22 vertical structures for learning and three WaSH facilities)
- Marawi Bahay Pag-asa Primary School (with five tents for learning)
- Marawi Sarimanok Central Elementary School (with five tents for learning)
- Dansalan National High School

TFBM support prioritized public schools, with little to no assistance given to private schools and colleges, whether secular or Islamic. This is a significant gap because Marawi City was home to numerous private schools that deliver primary to tertiary education, including Dansalan College that sustained damages but was left to rebuild independently.¹⁸¹ DepEd, however, provided PHP 10,000 worth of assistance to each of the 10 to 20 *madaris* under the *Brigada Eskwela* program.¹⁸²

Online learning under pandemic conditions has also been difficult due to the aforementioned access issues, rotating power outages, and patchy mobile phone and internet signal. Quality of education and learning is another problem altogether.

4.3 Livelihood

Tables 11 and 12 illustrate available data from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) regarding the types of support provided to IDPs as of December 2019 and February 2020, respectively.

Feedback from civil society and information from the hearings held by Congress and Special Committee on Marawi point to a mismatch between what was provided

by the government in terms of ‘livelihood assistance’ and actual economic realities in pre-siege Marawi. Maranaos are famous for being seasoned traders and would have benefitted greatly from a well-designed support program—therefore, this mismatch is a lost opportunity. In contrast, kits provided by DTI saturated IDP communities with smaller-scale livelihood support (e.g., giving sewing machines throughout the same area) and sidestepped the existing trader and consolidator social system that existed before the siege. For example, TESDA trainings for massage were criticized for transgressing religious and cultural norms. As such, it is therefore inappropriate for Maranao IDPs. Procured sari-sari store kits were also reportedly overpriced. While the Cooperative Development Authority focused on supporting organized networks, the lack of sensitivity around targeting reportedly fueled rifts in the Maranao business community and created negative incentives for people to register new cooperatives that were not necessarily functional.

A major issue lies in claiming land rights based on the old *padian* (marketplace). Traders who lived and worked in a particular space had informally paid to ‘own’ their spaces. However, their claims are not recognized because the said spaces are part of a reclaimed parcel legally owned by the City Government. It is unclear how former traders and vendors will be prioritized in the new Grand Padian being built in the MAA. In the meantime, some privately-owned markets have sprouted around the city, although none presently exist near the transitory shelters.¹⁸³ Another missed opportunity is the lack of serious investments in Islamic microfinance as part of Marawi economic recovery. The idea has been conceptually explored with support from some international donors. However, it has not come to fruition without serious investments in grants and the necessary infrastructure for roll-out.¹⁸⁴

Table 11. DTI Masterlist of beneficiaries as of December 2019

Categories	No. of beneficiaries
IDPs from the 24 most-affected barangays	14,692
IDPs from outside the 24 most-affected barangays	14,096
Home-based IDPs	4,732
Total	33,520

Source: Baunto, 2020¹⁸⁵; Special Committee on Marawi, 2020¹⁸⁶



Table 12. Educational attainment of Marawi IDPs supported by TESDA as of February 2020

Program	No. of enrolled IDPs	IDP Graduates		IDP graduates with certification	
		No.	%	No.	%
Training for Work Scholarship Program	8,525	8,262	96.9	5,385	65.2
Special Training for Employment Program	5,679	4,557	80.2	3,206	70.4
Universal Access to Quality Tertiary Education	650	-	-	-	-
Community-based Training	856	830	97.0	-	-
Total	15,710	13,649	86.9	8,591	62.9

Source: Baunto, 2020¹⁸⁷; Special Committee on Marawi, 2020¹⁸⁸

4.4 Security, Justice, and Social Cohesion

Four years and counting after the cessation of hostilities, the Daula Islamiyah-Maute Group remnants persist and have purportedly renewed their recruitment activities in a few municipalities around Lanao del Sur. Based on available studies around the agenda of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), recruitment is not limited to rural areas but also includes urban communities within Mindanao and far-away areas in Visayas and Luzon.¹⁸⁹

The reported activities indicate that the root causes of conflict that led to the rise of the Maute group still remain, amidst the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the creation of the BARMM in 2019 that were intended to alleviate some of the factors that motivate recruitment and participation in extremist activities. Despite ramped-up investments in P/CVE and the security sector, existing threats remain and will have to be addressed as the government complies with its ‘normalization’ commitments under the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. As raised in the public hearings facilitated by Congress and the BTA-SCM, both the Marawi rehabilitation and the normalization process must address the needs of affected MILF *mujahideen* and *muhajidat* and their children.

Ultimately, all efforts must be geared towards rebuilding trust within affected communities and between the communities and the government. This is a key message conveyed in the unreleased government PCNA’s Social Healing and Peacebuilding Assessment (SHPBA) quoted in the 2018 TFBM PCNA, in which the stated primary goal is best reflected in the following quoted portion:¹⁹⁰

Effective and successful rehabilitation interventions and programs should result to the following:

1. *Increase in people’s security and their sense of security.*
2. *People’s resistance to violence, provocations to violence, and adoption of a culture of peace.*
3. *Creation or reform of political institutions to handle the grievances, which drive or trigger conflicts.*
4. *Meaningful improvements in inter and intra- group relations.*
5. *Momentum for peace by causing individuals and communities to develop their own peace initiatives in relation to the critical elements of context analysis.*

The unreleased PCNA SHPBA further recommends the following interventions and actions:¹⁹¹

1. *To campaign for accountability and transparency that is framed within the spiritual and cultural values embraced by communities.*
2. *To establish an effective strategic communication component in all the programs.*
3. *To provide platforms and mechanisms for participation of key sectors*
4. *To capacitate key sectors and groups.*
5. *To partner and link with organizations and centers focused on conflict management.*



6. *To undertake conflict analysis for each of the reconstruction and rehabilitation programs to ensure that the processes, interventions, and structures positively impact on and contribute to the peace building goals.*
7. *To campaign for moral ascendancy.*
8. *To install and mainstream clean and efficient governance.*
9. *To establish effective security operations.*
10. *To ensure that the reconstruction and rehabilitation programs, processes and mechanisms are responsive and conflict, culture and gender sensitive.*
11. *To implement agreements that support the right to self-determination.*

However, the degree to which these recommended goals, interventions, and actions have translated into concrete policy and actual expenditure by the TFBM is mixed, at best.

In the legislative hearings led by the House of Representatives and the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, IDPs called for a Senate-led inquiry into the military's handling of the war. Apart from allegations that the bombing of Marawi was 'overkill' and could have been addressed through negotiations and backchanneling, there were also cases of human rights violations and sexual misconduct committed by security personnel reported by NGOs under the MHT.

Many IDP families also reported looting and vandalism, with losses of personal or household items including jewelry, cultural artifacts, money, and laptop—the scale of which was only fully understood when residents were finally allowed to visit their homes during the Kambisita in the 3rd quarter of 2018. At least two cases had evidence in the form of CCTV footage and eyewitnesses of military personnel taking booty from private homes and establishments wrecked by the siege, leading to six soldiers being charged in 2017.¹⁹² Other residents complained about trespassing and the AFP's informal policy allowing deployed soldiers to occupy private properties of homeowners. However, very few soldiers were tried and charged for the offenses despite the volume of valuable items lost. These are issues that should inform the Compensation Bill, which is still pending legislation.

A major concern is that so-called 'black flag' actors can use the unfinished reconstruction of Marawi to foment anger and dissatisfaction and motivate recruitment into their groups. Reports and on-the-record statements in public hearings facilitated by the Senate, Congress, and BTA have IDPs describing the delay and perceived mismanagement of Marawi reconstruction efforts as a form of "social injustice" and a second "tragedy in the making."¹⁹³

Beyond the vertical conflict between government forces and black flag groups, development policies without the necessary sensitivity to address other existing sources of dissatisfaction—such as the non-recognition of traditional cultural practices over land, housing, and property—can drive conflicts amongst various community stakeholders.

The gap between the recommended actions from various needs assessment programs and the present reality has led people to call for the Marawi siege's inclusion in the Philippine government's commitments towards transitional justice and reconciliation in the Bangsamoro. However, it is unclear how that might proceed until the Duterte administration acknowledges its own culpability.

4.5 Cultural sensitivity

Sensitivity to cultural, gender, and conflict-related dynamics were identified in the PCNA and by the BMCRRP as cross-cutting pillars of an effective post-crisis reconstruction strategy. However, the general difficulty in translating these principles into practice has serious implications for implementation efforts. The lack of clear communication and missteps in government-led efforts often gloss over the deep affronts to *maratabat* (deep sense of clan or family honor and self-esteem). Dignity is a crucial aspect of humanitarian and development practice; therefore, the people must be actively engaged in all the rehabilitation efforts.

The housing, land and property (HLP) issues described in earlier sections are grounded in how Philippine land and planning regulations do not consider pre-colonial LHP practices in the Bangsamoro. Marawi City and its residents have historically and culturally adhered to the mixed-use of urban spaces. The old *padian* marketplace, for example, showcased buildings where local traders had their stores on the ground floor and lived on the upper floors. In contrast, the Marawi RISE plan is based on the updated Marawi City Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), which



builds on the American-style exclusionary zoning prevalent in current Philippine planning practices. The CLUP and its Zoning Ordinance classify and apportion the exclusive use of spaces according to zones: commercial, residential, agricultural, institutional, reservation, and forest protected. This zoning practice may be theoretically sound, but it counters against the pre-siege norms. Implementing a plan that does not consider these norms guarantees higher levels of dispossession.

The one-size-fits-all design of transitory shelter lacks cultural sensitivity to gender and personal or physical space. The BTA, with guidance from Islamic scholars, has proposed more appropriate housing designs. In the same light, the lack of safe water is a serious health threat and a barrier for Muslims from practicing their daily ablutions. Similar dynamics are at play when the national government programs culturally insensitive (e.g. *haram*) assistance: pork products in relief goods, funding TESDA massage training, or underutilizing Islamic financial instruments in favor of loan arrangements with interest payments.

TFBM has addressed sensitivity towards cultural heritage in two ways: by encouraging weaving, *okir*, brassware, and other traditional handicrafts to support the livelihood of IDPs, and through discussions of built heritage with the assistance of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).^{194,195} Issues regarding *masjid* (mosque) demolition and reconstruction are particularly sensitive. Observers have criticized government rulings that disallow utilization of public funds to rebuild the *masjids* premised on the principle of the separation of Church and State and regulations forbidding the use of public funds for religious/private purposes. However, a precedent exists in the rehabilitation of Bohol's heritage churches, in which government funds were used to rebuild religious structures destroyed by the 2013 earthquake.¹⁹⁶

Looting of homes has also led to the loss of priceless and irreplaceable family *tarsila* (genealogies), Qu'rans, and other historical and cultural records.¹⁹⁷ A targeted process supporting cultural and historical documentation and memorialization is recommended. Initial steps were implemented by the Bangsamoro Museum, launched by the now-defunct ARMM Regional Government prior to transition. Their exhibits include Qu'ran, Darangen, and other items that survived the siege. There are also cultural mapping efforts run by Maranao historians and supported by NCCA.¹⁹⁸

4.6 Access to information

Across the board, the lack of consistent, complete, and up-to-date information and feedback platforms at the community level has not been addressed despite the availability of TFBM funding for communication activities. Most activities and funding were implemented and channeled through the state-run Philippine Information Agency (PIA).¹⁹⁹

Transcripts from the Congressional and Special Committee on Marawi hearings highlight IDPs' demand for greater transparency on how TFBM makes implementation choices, ranging from the unilateral decision and subsequent failure to implement a joint venture agreement, to the selection of contractors, to the supposed 'trust fund' and distribution of sale proceeds of debris materials. The aftermath of the JVA is a particular sticking point, as the National Housing Authority (NHA) remains the primary implementing agency for all MAA-related activities despite the inclusion of projects not necessarily within their agency expertise and mandate. Both houses of Congress and the Special Committee on Marawi recorded recommendations from IDPs to provide assistance directly to beneficiaries rather than coursing them through TFBM.

The lack of access to information has led to community perception of mismanagement and corruption, described by the Special Committee on Marawi report as follows:

*Overpriced contracted goods and services, "ghost" assistance, substandard materials, expired relief goods, culturally insensitive (e.g. haram) assistance, and cascading payola or cutbacks were some of the allegations they hurled against decision makers and project implementers. The Commission on Audit reports in the previous years pointed to substantial amount of money including donated assistance either unaccounted or unused.*²⁰⁰ ●





5. Towards a safe, peaceful, and dignified return?

The available information points to one clear message: the national government through the TFBM must honor its commitments and ensure the speedy and dignified return of displaced residents by 2021.

At the same time, efforts must be made to provide more authority, resources, and capacity to local actors—specifically, the parliament of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the local governments of Marawi City and Lanao del Sur, and Maranao civilian IDPs themselves—to lead the implementation and monitoring of recovery and reconstruction in the area. Devolving decision-making to local actors while continuing to provide national political, financial, and technical support is a pragmatic choice in light of local contextual complexities and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

5.1 Recommendations for the completion of the rehabilitation plan and return of the IDPs to the Most Affected Area (MAA)

As of present writing, TFBM has publicly committed to deliver basic horizontal and vertical infrastructure in the MAA and allow the return of the displaced residents by December 2021.²⁰¹ To do so, the government must swiftly resolve outstanding housing, land, and property issues and pass the Compensation Bill pending in Congress to ensure that IDP families will have the resources to rebuild

their destroyed homes. At publication date, it is unclear if the passage of the Marawi Compensation Bill or the completion of reconstruction in the MAA can be achieved before the change of administration in 2022.

In the meantime, interim support, particularly the provision of livelihood opportunities and essential utilities and services, must continue.

While TFBM focuses its expenditure on IDPs around Marawi City, the geographical coverage of rehabilitation programs must be expanded. The programs must also cover community-based IDPs who settled in areas such as Saguwaran, Marantao, Piagapo, and the so-called Bangsamoro Communities Outside the BARMM (BCOBARMM). Further, the programs must also cover IDPs who are now deriving their incomes elsewhere: in cities such as Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and other areas as far away as Visayas and Luzon.

Given the broader dynamics of the Bangsamoro region and its peace processes, Marawi's recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction must include a clear cultural and peacebuilding lens, which should include not only the drivers of the Marawi conflict (hence the inclusion of affected areas in Butig and Piagapo), but also cumulative effects of protracted displacement.



5.2 Recommendations for the design of possible monitoring tools to enable civil society to continue to track and share developments on the status of rehabilitation and the return of IDPs

This report identified four major technical issues that must be addressed in relation to monitoring and evaluating Marawi response efforts. These are: (1) expanding the framework for monitoring, evaluation, and delivery beyond physical infrastructure; (2) establishing baselines and estimating the protracted costs of conflict; (3) conducting an accurate stock-take of assistance; and (4) responding to specific community concerns related to the physical environment, land, housing, and property claims, social and economic development, cultural sensitivity, and access to information, as well as security, justice, and social cohesion. Again, all of these are moving targets and will need to be tracked across years and political transitions.

These initial findings are recommended to be expanded to a broader multi-stakeholder review of all Marawi post-crisis humanitarian, development, and peace and security programming. Such a review can build on existing BTA reports.


To initiate the multi-stakeholder review, there will be a need to build accessible portals and monitoring platforms that can be managed, utilized, and led by the citizens of Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to ensure truth-telling, reparations, and a guarantee of non-recurrence. Rigorous monitoring and evaluation efforts can benefit two streams: (1) internal targeting and tracking across TFBM subcommittees to improve implementation (building on Kathanor and Kathangombalay) and (2) external transparency and accountability (similar to the former FAITH and eMPATHY portals used by the government for Typhoon Yolanda response). These datasets should be locally-owned and updated, with access at regional, provincial and city/municipal levels, and not only held by national and donor agencies.

Ultimately, there is a need to shift from focusing on basic input/output level reporting and evaluation of physical rehabilitation towards a broader framework that is more appropriate to post-conflict reconstruction. Figure 30 illustrates one such framework synthesized by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) from various global examples. This can be further tailored to reflect the nuances and realities in Marawi and Lanao del Sur.

Although there may be a limited political appetite for such reviews at the national level, the grave impacts of the Marawi crisis and the ongoing displacements cannot be forgotten. Supporting pilots for both implementation and monitoring led by Bangsamoro leaders, academe, and civil society is a good place to start. ●



Figure 30. Conceptual Framework for Understanding Post-Conflict Reconstruction Processes



Source: Sakalasuriya et al., 2018²⁰²



End Notes

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
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


ANNEX 1

Timeline of Events, 2017-2018 (IDEALS)









TASK FORCE BANGKONG MARAWI (TFBM)

- 28 an inter-agency task force established to coordinate and facilitate the recovery, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of Marawi City

Establishment of National Response Cluster (NRC)

17

The National Response Cluster is in charge of facilitating and overseeing emergency response and recovery efforts in the aftermath of a terrorism-related crisis

KEY NEEDS OF RETURNEES

- Livelihood opportunities
- Basic services (WASH, health facilities, schools)
- Protection (against gender-based violence, recovery of legal documents)

CONCERNS IN EVACUATION CENTERS

- Desludging of latrines
- Shortage of Food Assistance
- Pressure for IDPs to return to places of origin or relocation sites

Post-conflict Needs Assessment from the Office of Civil Defense (OCD)

06

NRC is deactivated while Regional Response Cluster (RRC) is moved to TFBM Sub-committee on Health and Social Welfare

DSWD releases IDP Data based from DAFAC

21

Senator Gatchalian pushes for the inclusion of Marawi Rehabilitation in the 2018 National Budget

01

Release of Administrative Order No. 9 amending AO No. 3

27

Administrative Order No. 9 was approved last October 27, 2017 which establishes the Task Force Bangkong Marawi as filed in Administrative Order No. 3 last June 28, 2017.

TFBM will be composed of the following subcommittees and lead agencies:

- Reconstruction - DPWH
- Housing - HUDCC
- Health and Social Welfare - DSWD, DOH
- Business and Labor - DTI
- Peace and Order - DILG and DND



Government awards 500 transitional shelters to IDPs in Sagonsongan



IDPs return home through Kambalingan

29

Marawi residents living in barangays outside or near Ground Zero (most affected areas) return to their homes

2017

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

2018

Transfer of IDPs from Sarimanok 1 and 2 to Barangay Poblacion



DBM releases 2018 People's Budget

PHP 5 M Marawi Fund under unprogrammed new general appropriations

PHP 10 M fund for Marawi Rehabilitation and Recovery

PHP 1 B Included funding for Marawi under the Shared Service Facility's (SSF) program



Kambisita set up by Marawi LGU and TFBM where IDPs are accompanied by medical team and military to visit former homes in MAA to retrieve belongings



Transfer of IDPs from Iligan City to Marawi Tent City

Assistance received PHP 764 M relief assistance

PHP 596 M (DSWD)
PHP 51 M (DSWD ARMM)
PHP 62 M (ARMM HEART)
PHP 21 M (LGUs)
PHP 32 M (NGOs)

DSWD Dromic Data

27,770

returned IDPs from

42 barangays

PHP 432 M food & non-food items

PHP 883 M fund for DSWD FDS

03

3,524 housing units needed for IDPs unable to return to places of origin

HOUSING UNITS

2000 San Miguel Corporation
1500 JICA, UN Habitat, SHFC
250 ARMM Government
274 Lanao del Sur LGUs

PRIORITY FOR HOUSING UNITS

- formal residents of Marawi
- unable to return to homes living in Lake Lanao or "No Build Zones"

REPARATION

House Bill 7711 filed in Lower House by Representative Adiong, providing for monetary compensation for damaged properties in MAA.

Its counterpart, Senate Bill 1816 is filed in the Upper House by Senator Bam Aquino

Kawiyagan

TFBM and INGO distribution of livelihood assistance to IDPs

ARMM Shelter Support

ARMM turns over 36 transitional shelters in Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur

KATHANOR

TFBM-led initiative to build a comprehensive and definitive IDP database for recovery and targeting government assistance to permanent residents of Marawi City

TFBM-CSO Collaboration

- 3 Principles / Tenets:
1. Participative Partnership: build ownership among CSOs and communities for recovery and rehabilitation and
 2. Transparent and Accountable Governance: mobilize development assistance teams (DAT) to monitor rehabilitation efforts
 3. Peace-and-Trust-Building: facilitate communication, dissemination and feedback between government and communities

BANGKONG MARAWI COMPREHENSIVE RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION PLAN

COMPONENTS

- local governance and peace-building
- housing and settlements
- livelihood & business development
- physical infrastructure
- social services
- land resource management

AREAS COVERED

- Marawi (MAA), Piagapo, Butig

BUDGET: PHP 80 BILLION

TARGET FINALIZATION OF PLAN: JUNE 2018



HCT releases SRRO document for Marawi

Philippines Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) Response and Resources Overview

353,000
Total Displaced People
335,000
outside evacuation centers
18,000
inside evacuation centers

Priority Needs:

- Camp coordination and management
- Education
- Food security
- Health (including reproductive health)
- Logistics
- Protection (child protection, GBV)
- WASH



10

UN CERF allocates USD 2.5 M for Marawi Response

20



US government pledges USD 15 M (PHP 73 M) for relief, recovery, and rehabilitation of Marawi

05



Mindanao Humanitarian Team (MHT) is composed of UN agencies, international NGOs, and national NGOs focused on addressing humanitarian needs in Mindanao in light of recent events in Marawi City.

Philippines Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is composed of UN agencies and NGOs that coordinate sectoral response in support of line departments and local authorities. The team regularly evaluates humanitarian needs and seek urgent resources to avert unnecessary loss of life.

HCT updates SRRO document for Marawi

24

350,000 IDPs
based on DAFAC system

20,600 IDPs
in evacuation centers

332,400 IDPs
home-based

87,000 IDPs
returned home

USD 15.7 M funding received for responding organizations in Marawi

2017

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

2018



UN CERF adds USD 5 M from the underfunded humanitarian needs for Marawi Response (co-funded through UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, and local partners)

60,000
displaced families
21,247
returned families
600 families
in relocation sites


HCT updates SRRO document to extend humanitarian response until December 2018



UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator Oia Almgren said in a visit to Marawi:

"We will continue to work with the GRP to address the needs of displaced people.. The Marawi Conflict Response needs to go beyond Marawi City where large number of municipalities affected in Lanao del Sur continue to face poverty and limited social services over the years."

UN Agencies that received additional funding from UN CERF



UN Deputy Humanitarian Chief Ursula Mueller one year after end of Marawi War: "To see is to understand the challenge. More help from the international community is desperately needed. There is a long road ahead"

End of HCT's Humanitarian Response for Marawi



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ANNEX 2.

Assessing Funding for Marawi Recovery, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction - Full Report by iLead






Summary of Damages, Losses, and Needs of Marawi City, Butig, and Piagapo

Sector	Damages (PhP)	Losses (PhP)	Needs (PhP)
Infrastructure	106,796,267.36	360,465,575.42	17,111,568,568.78
Transportation	22,223,053.06	147,329,342.22	16,814,700,895.55
Water	16,694,256.60	125,051,722.53	131,330,515.84
Power	54,294,494.70	87,779,110.67	157,517,294.39
Telecommunications	13,314,463.00	305,400.00	8,019,863.00
Social	7,909,833,195.70	2,181,437,503.63	10,038,088,551.33
Housing	6,147,300,563.37	2,056,477,003.63	8,192,209,678.65
Health	324,747,000.00	112,593,000.00	356,643,314.25
Education	1,437,785,632.33	12,367,500.00	1,489,235,558.43
Productive	552,200,450.00	4,150,618,277.00	18,446,873,591.16
Agriculture	87,068,450.00	333,273,000.00	772,172,110.00
Industry, Trade and Services	0.00	3,727,939,277.00	17,216,381,481.16
Tourism and Culture	465,132,000.00	89,406,000.00	458,320,000.00
Cross-Sectoral	2,940,639,000.00	52,280,000.00	6,057,572,883.75
Government	2,940,639,000.00	52,280,000.00	3,648,039,383.75
Environment	0.00	0.00	2,409,533,500.00
GRAND TOTAL	11,509,468,913.06	6,774,801,356.05	51,654,103,595.02

Total Appropriations and Releases for Marawi Recovery, 2017-2020

	2017	2018	2019	2020	OVERALL
Budget for Marawi Recovery under the NDRRMF	-	10,000,000,000	3,500,000,000	3,500,000,000	17,000,000,000
Releases for Marawi Recovery under the NDRRMF	3,612,839,102	3,821,819,991	4,466,765,209	6,786,188,401	18,687,612,703

2017-2020 Releases under NDRRMF (GAA & Continuing Appro)



2021 Proposed Budget for Marawi

2021 Proposed Budget for Marawi Rehabilitation

Php5 Billion


Under the 2021 NDRRM Fund

Total Releases for Marawi Recovery By Sector, 2017-2020


Sector	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Housing and Settlement	274,397,555	174,502,407	2,408,206,142	5,182,234,949	8,039,341,053
Housing	218,537,125		1,953,936,125	2,066,650,628	4,239,123,878
Water	39,995,122	174,502,407	134,463,618	766,536,382	1,115,497,529
Power	15,865,308		319,806,399	45,932,228	381,603,935
Utilities				2,303,115,711	2,303,115,711
Livelihood and Business	75,337,800	272,421,896	152,200,000	111,544,944	611,504,640
Industry, Trade & Services	53,000,000	114,953,490			167,953,490
Agriculture	22,337,800				22,337,800
Skills Development		6,328,241			6,328,241
Livelihood		62,535,755		111,544,944	174,080,699
Business Development		88,604,410	152,200,000		240,804,410
Infrastructure		183,900,000	975,426,350	1,022,362,171	2,181,688,521
Public Works		183,900,000	131,322,775	391,722,957	706,945,732
LGU Infrastructure			458,191,000	558,191,000	1,016,382,000
Buildings			385,912,575	20,935,535	406,848,110
Peace and Order				48,581,253	48,581,253
Transportation				2,931,426	2,931,426
Local Governance and Peacebuilding	99,000,000	218,226,338	200,735,000		517,961,338
Peace and Order	99,000,000	5,422,000	133,000,000		237,422,000
Defense and Security		54,967,000	67,735,000		122,702,000
Peacebuilding		49,900,020			49,900,020
Local Governance		107,937,318			107,937,318
Social Services	3,140,855,500	2,333,932,250	252,039,050	294,538,764	6,021,365,564
Humanitarian Aid	3,005,000,000	2,286,060,365			5,291,060,365
Health	135,855,500		244,850,500		380,706,000
Education		44,041,885	4,930,550	3,276,800	52,249,235
Youth		1,408,000			1,408,000
Youth, Mental Health, Psychosocial Services		2,422,000	2,258,000		4,680,000
Livelihood				291,261,964	291,261,964
Land Resources Management		565,371,564	451,305,000	175,507,573	1,192,184,137
Land Resources Management, Solid Waste Management, Debris Management		565,371,564	52,315,000		617,686,564
Solid Waste Management			398,990,000	175,507,573	574,497,573
Cross Sectoral		450,000			450,000
Government		450,000			450,000
Others	23,248,247	73,465,536	26,853,667		123,567,450
Government (Communications)	23,248,247	73,465,536	26,853,667		123,567,450

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management







Sectoral Releases per Year




2018 Sectoral Releases




2019 Sectoral Releases





NDRRM Releases: Housing and Settlement



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/ LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2017	Water	LWUA	SARO-BMB-C-17-0020077	17-Nov-17	To cover the release of national government subsidy to the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the construction of water supply system projects in transitional shelter sites in Brgy. Sagonsongan, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, chargeable against the NDRRMF, as augmented, per OP approval dated October 30, 2017.	16-Nov-17			39,995,122	274,397,555
	Housing	NHA	SARO-BMB-C-17-0020081	17-Nov-17	To cover the funding requirement of the National Housing Authority for the Marawi Transitional Housing at Brgy. Sagonsongan, Marawi City, Lanao Del Sur, inclusive of community facilities, power and water connection and other maintenance and operating expenses.	16-Nov-17			218,537,125	
	Power	NEA	SARO-BMB-C-17-0023267	8-Dec-17	To cover the release of national government subsidy to the National Electrification Administration (NEA) for the construction of 13.2 KV power distribution lines and installation of KWH meters in the National Housing Authority (NHA) Transitional Shelter Sites in Brgy. Sagonsongan, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur.	6-Dec-17			15,865,308	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/ LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Water	LWUA	SARO-BMB-C-18-0023884	9-Oct-18	To support the implementation of the following P/A/Ps of LWUA in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P8,792,380 - Reactivation of the operations of Marawi City Water District 8,942,389 - Purchase of tools and equipment and repair/replacement of defective pipelines of the MCWD 7,177,320 - Immediate expansion of water system (extension of pipelines) of the MCWD		30,144,507		30,144,507	174,502,407
	Water	LWUA	SARO-BMB-C-18-00350035055	28-Dec-2018	To support the implementation of the following P/A/Ps of LWUA in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P8,792,380 - Reactivation of the operations of Marawi City Water District 8,942,389 - Purchase of tools and equipment and repair/replacement of defective pipelines of the MCWD 7,177,320 - Immediate expansion of water system (extension of pipelines) of the MCWD	11-Oct-18	70,000,000		70,000,000	
	Water				To support the implementation of the provision of water supply for temporary (P59,080,500) and permanent (P15,277,400) shelters	11-Oct-18	74,357,900		74,357,900	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/ LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2019	Power	NEA	SARO-BMB-C-19-0003694	17-May-19	To cover the release of national government subsidy to the NEA to support the implementation of the projects, programs and activities of Lanao del Sur Electric Cooperative Inc (LASURECO) in connection with the Marawi Rehabilitation and Recovery with OP approval dated March 15, 2019 Details as follows: P 5,500,000 - Procurement of maintenance vehicles (for rehabilitation works) 3,300,000 - Procurement of heavy equipment (for rehabilitation works) 138,365,385.13 - Rehab/revamp of distribution line 57,293,214.64 - Electrification of temporary shelter 8,896,169.53 - Electrification of permanent shelter	15-Mar-19	213,354,769		213,354,769	2,408,206,142
	Power	NEA	SARO-BMB-C-19-0014028	2-Oct-19	To cover the national government subsidy to the NEA to support the implementation of the programs, projects, and activities of the LASURECO in connection with the MRRRP per OP approval dated September 10, 2019	10-Sep-19	106,451,630		106,451,630	
	Housing	DPWH	SARO-BMB-A-19-0027576	26-Dec-19	To cover the Housing Program in Marawi City	19-Nov-19		1,910,900,000	1,910,900,000	
	Housing	SHFC	SARO-BMB-C-19-0021419	25-Nov-19	To cover the national government subsidy to the SHFC to support the land acquisition as part of the Marawi Shelter Project in connection with MRRRP	30-Oct-19	43,036,125		43,036,125	
	Water	LWUA	SARO-BMB-C-19-0020674	21-Nov-19	To cover the release of national government subsidy to LWUA for the provision of sewage treatment plant for the most affected area of Marawi City	30-Oct-19	120,640,000		120,640,000	
	Water	LWUA	SARO-BMB-C-19-0023323	6-Dec-19	To cover the release of national government subsidy to LWUA for the provision of bulk water supply for the most affected area of Marawi City	19-Nov-19	13,823,618		13,823,618	


Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2020	Housing	NHA	SARO-BMB-C-20-0006623	13-Apr-20	To cover the national government subsidy to NHA for the support of Housing Programs	24-Mar-20	1,910,900,000		1,910,900,000	5,182,234,949
	Water	LWUA	SARO-BMB-C-20-0006624	13-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements of Sewerage Treatment Plant in the Most Affected Area	25-Mar-20	555,360,000		555,360,000	
	Water	LWUA	SARO-BMB-C-20-0006647	13-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements of Bulk Water Supply in the Most Affected Area	25-Mar-20	211,176,382		211,176,382	
	Housing	SHFC	SARO-BMB-C-20-0007993	24-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements to initiate the site development phase of the Marawi Shelter Project of the SHFC that would serve as the permanent shelter for displaced family of Marawi Siege	30-Mar-20	155,750,628		155,750,628	
	Utilities	NHA	SARO-BMB-C-20-0010313	18-May-20	Release of funds to cover infrastructure projects with Underground Utilities in the Most Affected Area Details as follows: P 400,000,000.00 - Land acquisition for Road Right of Way 1,903,115,711.00 - 60% of the total budget cost for the primary, secondary and tertiary road infrastructure with solar lamp and underground utilities land development (P3,171,859,517.95)	11-May-20	2,303,115,711		2,303,115,711	
	Power	NEA	SARO-BMB-C-20-0014290	2-Jun-20	To support the construction of a 20 Mega Volt Ampere SubStation in Marawi City	19-Jun-20	45,932,228		45,932,228	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management





Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2017	Industry, Trade & Services	OSEC - CENTRAL	SARO-BMB-A-17-0020064	17-Nov-17	Release of funds to cover the implementation of the Bangon Marawi Livelihood Project	16-Nov-17			43,000,000	75,337,800
	Industry, Trade & Services	OSEC - CENTRAL	SARO-BMB-A-17-0023212	8-Dec-17	Release of funds to cover the Space for Livelihood Capacity Building and Development which was included in the Pre-Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) Requirements of the Task Force Bangon Marawi	5-Dec-17			10,000,000	
	Agriculture	DA - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT X	SARO-BMB-E-17-0020974	24-Nov-17	Release of funds to support the Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Marawi City, approved by the Office of the President per October 30, 2017 Memorandum from the Executive Secretary	21-Nov-17			4,000,000	
	Agriculture	DA - BFAR - CENTRAL OFFICE	SARO-BMB-E-17-0020975	28-Nov-17	Release of funds to support the Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Marawi City, approved by the Office of the President per October 30, 2017 Memorandum from the Executive Secretary	21-Nov-17			18,337,800	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management





Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Agriculture	BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016310	24-Jul-18	Release of funds to support the Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Marawi City, approved by the Office of the President per October 30, 2017 Memorandum from the Executive Secretary	25-May-18	1,000,000		1,000,000	272,421,896
	Agriculture	AGRICULTURAL CREDIT POLICY COUNCIL	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016311	24-Jul-18		25-May-18	10,000,000		10,000,000	
	Agriculture	BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES - REGIONAL OFFICE - X	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016312	24-Jul-18		25-May-18	53,423,070	3,380,420	56,803,490	
	Skills Development	OSEC - REGIONAL OFFICE NO. X	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016313	24-Jul-18	To support the implementation of the following projects, programs, and activities of DOST in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P2,215,675 - Deployment of innovative rainwater collection system in Marawi 5,310,000 - Industrial Technology Development Institute Livelihood Program for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Marawi 55,010,080 - DOST-XII supports for Marawi City Recovery Reconstruction and Rehabilitation thru Science and Technology Innovations 1,951,299 - Skills development on the production of DIY bamboo shelter 1,322,114 - Introduction of innovative system support (ISS) and management strategies to vegetable production to farmers 1,767,528 - Reviving the handloom weaving industry for the RRRP of Marawi and adjacent war-affected communities in Lanao del Norte 1,287,299 - Establishment of Corn Mill Processing Facility	27-Jun-18	6,328,241		6,328,241	
	Livelihood	OSEC - REGIONAL OFFICE NO. XII	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016314	24-Jul-18		27-Jun-18	52,347,080	2,663,000	55,010,080	
	Livelihood	INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016315	24-Jul-18		27-Jun-18	4,230,675	3,295,000	7,525,675	
	Agriculture	CENTRAL OFFICE	SARO-BMB-E-18-0024997	18-Oct-18	To cover the implementation of various P/A/Ps of the DAR-ARMM in connection with the MRRRP Details as follows: P3,500,000 - Community Driven Development 4,300,000 - Agri-Enterprise Development 19,150,000 - Common Service Facilities 9,500,000 - Sustainable Livelihood Proposal 10,000,000 - Islamic Micro-Finance 700,000 - DAR Capacity Building	10-Sep-18	47,150,000		47,150,000	
	Business Development	CDA - CENTRAL OFFICE	SARO-BMB-A-18-0014579	27-Jun-18	Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (MRRRP) under the NDRRM Fund, FY 2018 GAA	25-May-18	3,817,400		3,817,400	
	Business Development	CDA - KIDAPAWAN EXTENSION OFFICE	SARO-BMB-A-18-0014580	27-Jun-18	Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (MRRRP) under the NDRRM Fund, FY 2018 GAA	25-May-18	71,877,600	455,000	72,332,600	
	Business Development	ARMM-RCDA	SARO-BMB-D-18-0031123	26-Nov-18	Release of funds to support the implementation of the "Mogop Taho: Kaoyagan sa Marawi" (Let us Help: Livelihood in Marawi) Program in connection with the MRRRP Details as follows: P26,925 - Cooperatives and Cooperatives' Product Identification 3,000,000 - Provision of grants/cash loans 568,095 - Trainings on Cooperative Business Plan 568,095 - Capacity Enhancement on Islamic Microfinancing 2,272,380 - Cooperative Mandatory Trainings 3,480,000 - Monitoring and Evaluation of Trainings 1,806,915 - Stakeholders Forum 732,000 - Product Display	13-Nov-18	12,454,410		12,454,410	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2019	Business Development	DOST - RO XII	SARO-BMB-E-19-0022272	28-Nov-19	To cover the funding requirements for the implementation of MRRRP	4-Nov-19	152,200,000		152,200,000	152,200,000


Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management

Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2020	Livelihood	BARMM - MAFAR	SARO-LGRCB-20-0007318	20-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements for implementation of various projects in Marawi City Details as follows: P 1,325,000.00 - Sustainable Livelihood on Inland Fish Farming 4,360,000.00 - Sustainable Livelihood on Enhancement of Abaca Production and Processing 5,000,000.00 - Islamic Microfinance of Butig Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries 9,250,000.00 - Community-Driven Development for Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries and LGU Partners 10,072,500.00 - Provision of Common Service Facilities	12-Mar-20	30,007,500		30,007,500	111,544,914
	Livelihood	BARMM - MAFAR	SARO-LGRCB-20-0007918	23-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements for implementation of various projects in Marawi City Details as follows: P 14,308,000.00 - Dispersal of Livestock Poultry 900,000.00 - Establishment of Crop Demonstration Farm	30-Mar-20	15,208,000		15,208,000	
	Livelihood	DTI	SARO-BMB-A-20-0007317	20-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements to support the project management, distribution, and monitoring of the provision of the remaining 26,296 starter kits to the Internally Displaced Persons of the Marawi Siege	30-Mar-20	20,276,414		20,276,414	
	Livelihood	BARMM - MAFAR	SARO-LGRCB-20-0007919	23-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements for implementation of various projects in Marawi City Details as follows: 3,000,000.00 - Establishment of MAFAR-BARMM PMO 300,000.00 - Establishment of Pasture Area 10,413,000.00 - Provision of Seed and Planting Materials 10,000,000.00 - Establishment of Solar Power Irrigation System 10,000,000.00 - Establishment of Abaca Nursery 2,340,000.00 - Establishment of Multiplier Farm (Goat and Native Chicken) 10,000,000.00 - Establishment of Trading Post/Food Terminal	30-Mar-20	46,053,000		46,053,000	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



NDRRM Releases: Infrastructure



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Public Works	OSEC - CENTRAL OFFICE	SARO-BMB-A-18-0016275	24-Jul-18	To support the implementation of the following projects of DPWH in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P88,900,000 - Reconstruction/improvement of Agus Bridge I (Banggolo Bridge) 10,000,000 - Repair of Agus Bridge II (Mapandi Bridge) 85,000,000 - Reconstruction of Agus Bridge III (Pumping Bridge)	27-Jun-18		183,900,000	183,900,000	183,900,000

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2019	Public Works	DPWH	SARO-BMB-A-19-0019720	18-Nov-19	To cover the implementation of the preventive maintenance program for the 47 units of heavy equipment received from People's Republic of China which are currently deployed in various Marawi City and Lanao del Sure for the families displaced by Marawi siege. Per OP approval dated October 30, 2019	30-Oct-2019	131,322,775		131,322,775	975,426,350
	LGU Infrastructure	DPWH	SARO-BMB-A-19-0027576	26-Dec-19	To cover the infrastructure projects of City Government of Marawi LGU Details as follows: P 129,826,000 - Barangay complexes with health center and Madrasah 119,835,000 - Peace Memorial Park 144,932,000 - Grand Padian Central Market 23,440,000 - Marawi Museum 40,158,000 - School of Living Tradition	7-Nov-19		458,191,000	458,191,000	
	Buildings	DPWH	SARO-BMB-A-19-0027576	26-Dec-19	To cover the construction of Marawi City's Command Center,	19-Nov-19		100,000,000	100,000,000	
	Buildings	DPWH	SARO-BMB-A-19-0027576	26-Dec-19	To cover the construction of a 1,500 Linear Perimeter Fence of Mindanao State University,	18-Nov-19		20,935,535	20,935,535	
	Buildings	DPWH	SARO-BMB-A-19-0027576	26-Dec-19	To cover the implementation of various projects Details as follows: P 33,656,940 - Construction of classroom for schools in Brgy. Kilala Permanent Shelter 157,850,000 - Reconstruction of 78 totally damaged and/or dilapidated 10,500,000 - Reconstruction of 7 totally damaged and/or dilapidated (?)	19-Nov-19		202,006,940	202,006,940	
	Buildings	DPWH - CO*	SARO-BMB-A-19-0023343	6-Dec-19	To cover the construction of various infrastructure projects in the Most Affected Area of Marawi City Details as follows: P 10,379,065 - BFP - construction of Marawi Central Fire Station 52,591,035 - DepEd - construction of Moncado Kadingilan Integrated School	18-Nov-19 19-Nov-19		62,970,100	62,970,100	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management




Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2020	Public Works	DPWH-CO	SARO-BMB-A-20-0001076	24-Feb-20	To cover the rehabilitation/improvement of Mual Lumbaca Ingud - Ranaranao Road in Maul, Maranto, Lanao del Sur			80,250,000	80,250,000	1,022,362,171
	LGU Infrastructure	CITY GOVERNMENT OF MARAWI	SARO-LGRCB-20-0006646	13-Apr-20	To cover the implementation of various P/A/P of City Government of Marawi Details as follows: P 129,826,000.00 - Barangay Complexes with Health Center and Madrasah 119,835,000.00 - Peace Memorial Park 144,932,000.00 - Grand Padian Central Market 23,440,000.00 - Marawi Museum 40,158,000.00 - School of Living Tradition	24-Mar-20	558,191,000		558,191,000	
	Buildings	MSU	SARO-BMB-F-20-0006169	6-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements for the construction of 1,500 linear meter Perimeter Fence	24-Mar-20		20,935,535	20,935,535	
	Peace and Order	PNP	SARO-BMB-D-20-006563	7-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements for the establishment of Tourist Police Unit Building in the Most Affected Area of Marawi City			12,270,053	12,270,053	
	Peace and Order	PNP	SARO-BMB-D-20-0006564	7-Apr-20	To cover the funding requirements for the construction of Maritime Building in the Most Affected Area of Marawi City	27-Mar-20		36,311,200	36,311,200	
	Transportation	PPA	SARO-BMB-C-20-0010171	18-May-20	Release of National Government subsidy to the Philippine Ports Authority to support the conduct of Preliminary Engineering Activities for the Construction of Port Facilities in the MAA of Marawi City	30-Mar-20	2,931,426		2,931,426	
	Public Works	DPWH	SARO-BMB-A-20-0007156	20-Apr-20	Release of funds to cover the implementation of various infrastructure projects in Region X Details as follows: P 221,926,429.00 - Construction of 2-lane PCCP Pantar-Marawi City Road 40,000,000.00 - Reconstruction of Bridge along Barangay Road at Kurmatan Matampay	12-Mar-20		261,926,429	261,926,429	
	Public Works	DA - NMIS	SARO-BMB-E-20-0013984	6-Jul-2020	To cover the construction of Halai Slaughterhouse in MAA of Marawi City	19-Jun-20	49,546,528		49,546,528	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



NDRRM Releases: Local Governance and Peacebuilding



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2017	Peace and Order	DILG - PNP	SARO-BMB-D-17-0020074	17-Nov-17	Release of funds to cover peace and order activities relative to Marawi Pre-Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), chargeable against National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (NDRRMF), as augmented, per Office of the President approval dated October 30, 2017.	16-Nov-17			99,000,000	99,000,000

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Defense and Security	AFP	SARO-BMB-D-18-0015291	9-Jul-18	Release of funds to support the acquisition of land in Marawi City as site for a new military camp	26-Jun-18		51,375,500	51,375,500	218,226,338
	Defense and Security	OSEC - PROPER	SARO-BMB-D-18-0016392	25-Jul-18	Release of funds to support its Bangon Marawi Security Project	25-Jun-18	3,591,500		3,591,500	
	Peacebuilding	OPAPP	SARO-BMB-D-18-0016393	25-Jul-18	Release of funds to support its project/program focused on social healing and peace building for Marawi Details as follows: P3,798,880 - Social healing and peace building 16,441,131 - Conflict sensitive and peace promotion mainstreaming 4,709,998 - Improved group and intergroup relationship and socio-economic conditions of IDPs	27-Jun-2018	24,950,010		24,950,010	
	Local Governance	BTr	SARO-LGRCB-18-0016607	27-Jul-18	Release of funds to cover the implementation of various P/A/Ps of the City Government of Marawi in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P5,000,000 - Marawi City Government Civil Registration System 5,000,000 - Support to Local Economic Recovery through the Reduction of the Cost of Doing Business: Business One-Stop Shop for Business Permits and Licensing System 1,500,000 - Marawi City Government Help Desk and IEC Support on Land Claims	3-Jul-18	11,500,000		11,500,000	
	Local Governance	BFP	SARO-BMB-D-18-0018204	14-Aug-18	Release of funds to support the implementation of the P/A/Ps of the BFP in connection with the MRRRP Details as follows: P85,616,349.55 - Purchase of essential BFP equipment, supplies and materials 3,000,000,000 - Installation of fire hydrants 7,320,968.20 - Construction of BFP facilities	2-August-18		96,437,318	96,437,318	
	Peace and Order	BJMP	SARO-BMB-D-18-0018739	20-Aug-18	To support the implementation of P/A/Ps of the BJMP in connection with the MRRRP Details as follows: P1,000,000 - Land acquisition (1,650 sqm) 4,422,000 - Purchase of essential BJMP equipment, supplies and materials	3-Aug-18	112,000	5,310,000	5,422,000	
	Peacebuilding	OPAPP	SARO-BMB-D-18-0016393	25-Jul-18	Release of funds to support its project/program focused on social healing and peace building for Marawi Details as follows: P3,798,880 - Social healing and peace building 16,441,131 - Conflict sensitive and peace promotion mainstreaming 4,709,998 - Improved group and intergroup relationship and socio-economic conditions of IDPs	27-Jun-2018	24,950,010		24,950,010	


Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2019	Defense and Security	AFP	SARO-BMB-D-1900002853	28-Mar-10	Release of funds to support the operational and logistical requirements of the AFP in connection with the Marawi rehabilitation and recovery pursuant to the approval of the Office of the President dated December 28, 2018 Details as follows: P 9,170,000 - Operational requirements 9,465,000 - Clearing of UXO/IED and demolition of explosives requirements 9,000,000 - Procurement of MEE for ISO 25,000,000 - Security operations 10,000,000 - Troop hutment 3,500,000 - Repair and maintenance of equipment 1,000,000 - Establishment of AFP Marawi Maritime Outpost		61,135,000	6,000,000	67,135,000	200,735,000
	Defense and Security	DND-Osec	SARO-BMB-D-19-0014609	7-Oct-19	To cover funding requirements for Bangon Marawi Security Project pursuant to OP approval dated August 19, 2019	19-Aug-19	600,000		600,000	
	Peace and Order	BJMP	SARO-BMB-19-0014029	2-Oct-19	To support the construction of New Marawi City Jail pursuant to OP approval dated September 16, 2019	16-Sep-19		133,000,000	133,000,000	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management

NDRRM Releases: Social Services



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2017	Humanitarian Aid	DSWD-OSEC	SARO-BMB-B-17-0018998	9-Nov-17	Release of allotment to cover the implementation of Continuing Relief Assistance and Cash-for-Work for the Internally Displaced Persons of Marawi City chargeable against NDRRMF, as augmented, per OP approval dated October 30, 2017.	7-Nov-17			3,000,000,000	3,140,855,500
	Health	DOH	SARO-BMB-B-17-0023273	12-Dec-17	Release of funds to cover the implementation of activities for the recovery and rehabilitation of Marawi City chargeable against NDRRMF, as augmented, per OP approval dated October 30, 2017, details per Annex A	6-Dec-17			135,855,500	
	Humanitarian Aid	OEO - PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE URBAN POOR	27-Dec-2017	27-Dec-17	Release of funds to cover the implementation of activities for the recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation of Marawi City chargeable against NDRRMF, as augmented, per OP approval dated October 30, 2017	25-May-18	3,817,400		5,000,000	

Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Education	MSU-LANAO NATIONAL COLLEGE OF ARTS AND TRADES	SARO-BMB-F-18-0016533	27-Jul-18	Release of funds to cover the replacement of the looted and destroyed facilities, tools and equipment of MSU-Lanao NCAT in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P766,666 - Automotive tools and equipment 1,263,560 - Machine tools and equipment 660,365 - Building construction tools and equipment 1,002,172 - Electricity tools and equipment 403,375 - Drafting tools and equipment 1,893,266 - Computer technology tools and equipment 596,660 - Food trades tools and equipment 713,800 - Garment trades tools and equipment 3,156,138 - Equipment and tools for natural science and mathematics department 1,500,000 - Facilities, tools and equipment of libraries, JHS, SHS and college 2,362,040 - Office equipment, tools and facilities for the offices of administration building	27-Jun-18		14,318,045	14,318,045	2,333,932,250
	Humanitarian Aid	DSWD OSEC - CENTRAL OFFICE	SARO-BMB-B-18-0018207	14-Aug-18	Release of funds to support the implementation of various P/A/PS of DSWD in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P1,427,846,000 - Basic transitory family support package 675,199,200 - Provision of livelihood settlement grants 183,015,164 - Operational support fund (admin and operational expense)	25-Jun-18	2,279,945,365	6,115,000	2,286,060,365	
	Youth	OEO - NYC	SARO-BMB-B-18-0018211	14-Aug-18	To cover funding requirements for the implementation of program for the MRRRP Details as follows: P844,000 - Bangon Para sa Kabataan at Kapayapaan Program 654,000 - National Youth Empowerment Training Program	28-Jun-18	1,408,000		1,408,000	



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Youth, Mental Health, Psychosocial Services	OEO - NYC	SARO-BMB-B-18-0027453	13-Nov-18	To cover funding requirements for the implementation of the program for the MRRP specifically for augmentation of mental health and psycho-social services	28-Jun-18	2,422,000		2,422,000	2,333,932,250
	Education	ARMM-RDEPED	SARO-BMB-D-18-0032092	5-Dec-18	To support the implementation of various P/A/Ps of DepEd in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P12,600,000 - Feeding program expansion 780,000 - Support to Schools as Zone of Peace 5,837,680 - Trainings and implementation of alternative delivery modes/flexibility learning options (ADMs/FLOs) for learners outside of school (Marawi City) 1,674,000 - Provision of school furniture 970,000 - Provision of Learner's Kit (Piagapo, Lanao del Sur) 3,446,080 - Trainings and implementation of alternative delivery modes/flexibility learning options for learners outside of schools (Piagapo, Lanao del Sur) 970,000 - Provision of Learner's Kit (Butig) 3,446,080 - Trainings and implementation of alternative delivery modes/flexibility learning options for learners outside of schools (Butig)	13-Nov-18	29,723,840		29,723,840	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management

Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2019	Youth, Mental Health, Psychosocial Services	OEO - NYC	SARO-BMB-B-19-0002869	28-Mar-19	To cover funding requirements for the implementation of programs for the Marawi Rehabilitation and Recovery, specifically for Marawi Augmentation of Mental Health and Psycho-social Services, with OP approval dated June 28, 2018	28-Jun-18	2,258,000		2,258,000	252,039,050
	Health	OSEC - CO	SARO-BMB-B-19-0005158	20-Jun-19	To cover construction of various health facilities and public toilet and procurement of medical equipment under Marahi Rehabilitation and Recovery with OP approval dated October 11, 2018	11-Oct-18		244,850,500	244,850,500	
	Education	DepEd Regional Office	SARO-BMB-D-19-0023195	5-Dec-19	To cover the funding requirements for the purchase of school furniture for the various schools in BARMM affected by the Marawi siege	19-Nov-19		1,653,750	1,653,750	
		DEPED*			To cover the implementation of various activities Details as follows: 616,800 - Printing of Education in Emergency materials 720,000 - Support to School as Zone of Peace 970,000 - Provision of Learners Kit (Piagapo) 970,000 - Provision of Learners Kit (Butig) Per letter dated Dec 13, 2019 from DepEd	19-Nov-19	3,276,800		3,276,800	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management


* Office of the President approved for SARO issuance



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2020	Education	DEPED-CO	SARO-BMB-F-20-0003984	24-Mar-20	To cover the funding requirements for the implementation of various projects relative to MRRRP Details as follows: P 616,800.00 - Printing of Education in Emergency (EiE) Materials 720,000.00 - Support to Schools as Zone of Peace 970,000.00 - Provision of Learning Kits (Piagapo) 970,000.00 - Provision of Learning Kits (Butig)	5-Mar-20	3,276,800		3,276,800	294,538,764
	Livelihood	DSWD	SARO-BMB-B-20-0014082	10-Jul-20	To cover the continuation of Sustainable Livelihood Program	13-May-20	291,261,964		291,261,964	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management

NDRRM Releases: Land Resources Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Land Resources Management, Solid Waste Management, Debris Management	OSEC - CENTRAL OFFICE	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016451	26-Jul-18	To cover the funding requirements for the implementation of the MRRRP Details as follows: P48,000,000 - Land Resources Management 508,530,000 - Solid Waste Management Sewerage Treatment 8,841,563 - Debris Management Project Monitoring Team (same as above) (same as above)		2,500,000		2,500,000	565,371,564
	Land Resources Management, Solid Waste Management, Debris Management	OSEC - REGIONAL OFFICE X	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016452	26-Jul-18		11-Jul-18	36,916,564	17,425,000	54,341,564	
	Land Resources Management, Solid Waste Management, Debris Management	ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU RO X	SARO-BMB-E-18-0016453	26-Jul-18			99,530,000	409,000,000	508,530,000	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management

Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2019	Land Resources Management. Debris Management	DENR - OSEC	SARO-BMB-E-19-0013896	1-Oct-19	To cover funding requirements for the implementation of the Marawi Recovery, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (MRRRP) per OP approval dated September 10, 2019 Details as follows: 45,550,000 - Land Resource Management 6,765,000 - Debris Management	10-Sep-19	1,570,000		1,570,000	451,305,000
	Land Resources Management. Debris Management	DENR - RO X	SARO-BMB-E-19-0013897	1-Oct-19		10-Sep-19	10,780,000		10,780,000	
	Land Resources Management. Debris Management	DENR - RO XII	SARO-BMB-E-19-0013898	1-Oct-19		10-Sep-19	30,200,000	3,000,000	33,200,000	
	Land Resources Management. Debris Management	EMB	SARO-BMB-E-19-0013899	1-Oct-19		10-Sep-19	3,715,000	3,050,000	6,765,000	
	Solid Waste Management	EMB	SARO-BMB-E-19-0021373	25-Nov-19		31-Oct-19	58,990,000	340,000,000	398,990,000	


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Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2020	Solid Waste Management	EMB	SARO-BMB-E-20-0011193	2-Jun-20	To cover the continuation and coverage of the expenses of the Solid Waste Management Project in Marawi City	13-May-20	68,648,194	91,859,379	160,507,573	175,507,573
	Solid Waste Management	EMB	SARO-BMB-E-20-0014065	9-Jul-20	To cover the continuation and coverage of the expenses of the Solid Waste Management Project in Marawi City	13-May-20		15,000,000	15,000,000	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



NDRRM Releases: Others (Government Communications)



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2017	Government	PCOO - BUREAU OF BROADCAST SERVICES	SARO-BMB-C-17-0023454	12-Dec-17	To cover the implementation of the PBS Marawi Broadcast Center as part of the Task Force Bangon Marawi Information Management and Strategic Communications Plan, chargeable against NDRRMF, as augmented, per OP approval dated October 30, 2017	12-Dec-17			10,380,000	23,248,247
	Government	PCOO - PIA	SARO-BMB-C-17-0023945	14-Dec-17	To cover the implementation of relevant activities with regard to Marawi particularly in the Information Management and Strategic Communications for FY 2017, chargeable against NDRRMF, as augmented, per OP approval dated October 30, 2017	12-Dec-17			12,868,247	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Government	PTNI	SARO-BMB-C-18-0016272	24-Jul-18	To support the implementation of the project/program in connection with MRRRP Details as follows: P48,040,000 - PTNI-PCOO broadcast hub with accessories 6,900,000 - Yearly MOOE	20-Jun-18	6,900,000	48,040,000	54,940,000	73,465,536
	Government	PIA	SARO-BMB-C-18-0032927	10-Dec-18	To cover the implementation of relevant activities with regard to Marawi particularly in the Information Management and Strategic Communications for FY 2018, chargeable against NDRRMF Details as follows: P1,584,000 - Production of information, education, and communication (IEC) materials 7,843,188 - Continuous operations of the Iligan-Marawi Communications Command Center 3,945,000 - Continuous implementation of the information and serbisyo caravans 2,180,000 - TFBM social media campaign 1,394,948 - Official TFBM website 578,4000 - Bangon Marawi Press Briefings 1,000,000 - Bangon Marawi, Bangon Ranao Solidarity Gathering	22-Nov-18	14,988,536	3,537,000	18,525,536	


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Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2019	Government	PBS - BBS	SARO-BMB-C-19-0006223	4-Jul-19	To cover the enhancement of BBs DXSO-Radyo Pilipinas (RP) - Marawi, chargeable against the FY 2018 NDRRM Fund per OP approval dated May 29, 2019	29-May-19	400,000	26,153,667	26,553,667	26,853,667
	Government	PBS - BBS	SARO-BMB-C-19-0008854	2-Aug-19	To cover the acquisition of ICT equipment for the BBS DXSO-Radyo Pilipinas - Marawi per OP approval dated May 29, 2019	29-May-19		300,000	300,000	

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



NDRRM Releases: Cross-Sectoral (Government)



Year	Sub-sector	Implementing agency/LGU	SARO NO.	Date	Purpose	Date of op approval/ Remarks	Releases			Sector total per year
							MOOE	CO	TOTAL	
2018	Government	OEO - NYC	SARO-BMB-B-18-002353	5-Oct-18	To cover funding requirements for the implementation of program for the MRRRP specifically for set-up of Child and Youth-friendly spaces	28-Jun-18	450,000		450,000	450,000

Note: Based on Reports from the Department of Budget and Management



Institution	Project Title	Cost in Million pesos	Implementing / Recipient Agencies, if identified	Sector
Loans (Php28B)				
ADB	Emergency Assistance for Reconstruction and Recovery of Marawi, Component 1: Quick disbursing support for Marawi Recovery (2018-2022) [4] [8]	15,534 [a]	DOF, DepEd, DOH, DSWD	Governance and Institutions Development; Social Development
	Emergency Assistance for Reconstruction and Recovery of Marawi: Civil Works (2018-2024; loan + PH counterpart) [4] [1] [8]	6,835 [a]	DOF, DPWH	Governance and Institutions Development; Infrastructure
China	Marawi Rehabilitation - Bridge and Bypass Project [1]	998.7	DPWH, HUDCC	Infrastructure
World Bank	Marawi Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (FY 2021-22) Project under Country Partnership Framework 2019-2023 [6]	5,060		
SUBTOTAL		28,428		
Grants (Php9.02B)				
ADB	Grant: Emergency Assistance for Reconstruction and Recovery of Marawi Component 3: Restoring water utilities (2019-2020) [4]	243.1 [a]	LWUA, DOH	Social Reform and Community Development
	Grant: Output 4: Social Services and Livelihood Support (from Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction; 2019-2021) [4]	145.9 [a]	DOLE, DPWH, DTI, DepEd	
EU	Grant: Mindanao Peace and Development Program-Peace and Development in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	287.28 (EUR 5.0M of EUR 24.5-M grant)	DOF	
UN - World Food Programme	Immediate Response Emergency Operation for people affected by armed conflict in Marawi (2017)	23.97 (USD 0.47M)	ARMM	Social Reform and Community Development
UNDP	Financial inclusion for the recovery of Marawi [9]	15.95 (USD 0.3 million)	Donor-implemented	Social Reform and Community Development
UN Habitat; Government of Japan	Project for Rebuilding Marawi through Community-Driven Shelter and Livelihood Support [9]	545.32 (USD 10.26 million)	Donor-implemented	Social Reform and Community Development
UN - FAO	Marawi Recovery Project: Support for Enhancing Agriculture-based livelihoods of Internally Displaced Farmers Affected by the Marawi Conflict [9]	40.93 (USD 0.77 million)	DA	Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, and Natural Resources



JICA	Road Network Development Project in Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao: Marawi City Ring Road [2]	1,759	DPWH	
	Grant: Support for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Marawi City and Its Surrounding Areas [3]	631	DPWH	
	Programme for the Support for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Marawi City and its Surrounding Areas [9]	940.8 (17.70 million USD)	DOF	Social Reform and Community Development
	Reconstruction and Development Plan for Greater Marawi [1][3]	970	DPWH	
USAID	Marawi Response Project [9]	1,328.75 (USD 25 million)	LGU	Governance and Institutions Development
USAID	Support to People Displaced by the Marawi Conflict - Early Recovery [5]	322.09 (6.06 million USD)	Catholic Relief Services;	Governance and Institutions Development
	Emergency Basic Intervention for IDPs affected by Marawi Conflict [5]	263.09 (4.95 million USD)	Action Against Hunger-Spain;	Governance and Institutions Development
	Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the Displaced People of Marawi [5]	263.09 (4.95 million USD)	Action Against Hunger-Spain;	Governance and Institutions Development
DFAT-Australia	Response and Recovery Assistance for Marawi [7]	1,048		
China	Donation - Heavy equipment for the rehabilitation and rebuilding of Marawi City	153.8	DPWH	Infrastructure
AECID (Spain)	Strengthening professional competencies, civic commitment and employability of the youth and displaced women in Marawi and Zamboanga [5]	34.55 (0.65 million USD)	Humanismo y Democracia	Governance and Institutions Development
SUBTOTAL		9,016.62		



Grants with Marawi Component (Php2.67B)				
	Mindanao Trust Fund (EU, DFAT, Spain)	unknown		
World Bank	Mindanao Trust Fund (EU) [9]	727.62 (13.69 million)		Governance and Institutions Development
	Mindanao Trust Fund (Spain) [5]	58.99 (1.11 million)	Bangsamoro Development Authority; CFSI	Governance and Institutions Development
	Mindanao Trust Fund (additional funding) [5] [10]	170.08 (3.20 million)		Governance and Institutions Development
	Development Credit Authority Loan Portfolio Guarantee for 1st Valley Bank [5]	34.55 (0.65 million USD)	SMEs in Mindanao, including Marawi	Industry, Trade, and Tourism
USAID	Integrated Maternal, Neonatal, Child Health and Nutrition/Family Planning Regional Projects [9]	1,617.89 (30.44 million USD)	DOH	Social Reform and Community Development
	Applying Binding, Bonding, and Bridging for Peace Program	60.6 (1.14 million USD)	MINDA	Governance and Institutions Development
SUBTOTAL		2,669.73		
GRAND TOTAL		40,114.05		

[1] NEDA. Revised List of Infrastructure Flagship Projects as of 17 February 2020.

[2] JICA. Road Network Development Project in Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao: Initial Environmental Examination of Marawi City Ring Road. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/id/asia/southeast/philippines/c8h0vm0000b5zc0s-att/c8h0vm0000f4pxsd.pdf

[3] DBM. Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing

[4] ADB. Emergency Assistance for Reconstruction and Recovery of Marawi. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/52313/52313-001-lna-en.pdf>

[5] NEDA. List of Non-ODA Grants as of December 2019. <https://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Annex-2-L-List-of-Non-ODA-Grants.pdf>

[6] World Bank. Philippines Country Partnership Framework. <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/891661574699296055/pdf/Philippines-Country-Partnership-Framework-for-the-Period-July-2019-December-2023.pdf>

[7] AusAid. Philippines Aid Program Performance Information 2018-19. <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/DFAT%20-%20Philippines%20Aid%20Program%20Performance%20Report%202018-19.pdf>

[8] NEDA. List of Active ODA Loans as of March 2019. https://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/List-of-Active-ODA-Loans-as-of-March-2019_with-Project-Descriptions_Upload.xlsx

[9] NEDA. List of Active ODA Grants as of December 2018. https://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/List-of-Active-ODA-Grants-as-of-December-2018_Upload.xlsx

[10] New Funding for Mindanao Trust Fund to Strengthen Peace and Development in Southern Philippines. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/04/10/new-funding-for-mindanao-trust-fund-to-strengthen-peace-and-development-in-southern-philippines>

[a] at P51.78=\$1; exchange rate by Oct 2019

[b] at P53.15=\$1, exchange rate by end 2018

[c] at P50.60=\$1, exchange rate by end 2019

[d] figures may not add up due to rounding

[e] at P51.28=\$1; exchange rate by Oct 2017



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The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a private, public-interest, non-profit educational political foundation of Germany named after the social democrat Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany. Its work in the Philippines started in 1964. Its focus is on the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of social and ecological dimensions of economic development through education, research, political dialogue, and international cooperation. The FES Philippines Office cooperates with national and local government institutions, trade unions, political and social movements, non-government organizations, media practitioners and groups, scientific institutions, individual experts, and other international organizations.



The International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance (INCITEGov) is a policy research and advocacy center that catalyzes and provides support to democratic movements and reform initiatives in the Philippines. It firmly believes in the democratic process and the rule of law as the bedrock of the Philippine society.

INCITEGov applies the P-G-D lens in its analysis of key national issues and underscores that Democratic Politics (P) must be linked to Good Governance (G) to ensure that Development Outcomes (D) will secure the interests of the poor and marginalized.

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The background image is a photograph of a street in Marawi, Philippines, showing the aftermath of conflict. The buildings on either side of the street are heavily damaged, with exposed concrete and missing windows. In the distance, a mosque minaret is visible against a hazy sky. The overall tone of the image is somber and desolate.

About the Author

Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez is a development researcher who has spent the last decade working on program implementation and evaluation in conflict-vulnerable areas in Mindanao, consulting with various government and international development organizations. In the months after the Marawi crisis, she co-facilitated an interdisciplinary team that assisted the now-defunct ARMM Regional Government and local and national governments on participatory mapping of affected areas in Marawi and Lanao del Sur. Ica holds an MA in Urban and Regional Planning from the University of the Philippines and an MPhil in Planning, Growth, and Regeneration from the University of Cambridge. She is presently a PhD researcher at the University of Cambridge.

About the Review

This report was commissioned by INCITEGov with support from Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Philippines to assist ongoing efforts by Maranao civil society organizations for a peaceful citizen-led return of displaced residents to the Islamic City of Marawi. The review was conducted from August to September 2020 and synthesized existing data and reports collected by relevant bodies in the House of Representatives and the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, as well as reports from media, donor agencies, and civil society. The analysis also draws from a supplementary Marawi budget and expenditure review conducted by the Institute for Leadership, Empowerment, and Democracy (iLEAD). Preliminary findings were presented in an exclusive online forum with Maranao civil society partners on 19 October 2020 titled *Tatlong Taong Bakwit*.